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Definition of the Challenge: 
 
Large-scale violent conflict takes several forms and our focus is far from comprehensive. 
Recent media attention has been dominated by Iraq and it is important to acknowledge at 
the outset that this type of situation is not covered in our analysis. Iraq is in many respects 
highly atypical of modern conflict. It began as an international war, yet over time 
international conflict has tended to become far less common. Most warfare in low-
income countries is internal. The situation in Iraq has indeed evolved into what is 
currently probably best described as an ongoing civil war. While our focus is indeed civil 
war, the interventions that we evaluate here are designed to prevent rather than arrest 
such wars. In the first challenge paper on conflict for the Copenhagen Consensus, Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004) also chose to focus on civil wars. However, within this remit they 
were more ambitious than the present paper, including the ‘deep prevention’ of civil war, 
the ending of on-going conflicts, and the prevention of the recurrence of violence in post-
conflict situations. In this paper our ambition is more limited. We focus predominantly on 
the prevention of the recurrence of violence in post-conflict societies. This restricted 
focus enables us to consider post-conflict instruments in more depth, and it is also the 
core of the problem of violent conflict. Around half of all civil wars are post-conflict 
relapses. From this core we range a little more widely, taking in the prevention of coups 




Civil war is often horrific. Unlike the American Civil War of the nineteenth century, 
modern civil wars in low-income countries overwhelmingly affect the civilian 
population. They target the most vulnerable members of societies that are already the 
most impoverished on earth. Their consequences are often highly persistent: child 
soldiers who have been taught to kill are not only appalling victims, they are a menace to 
their society for many years to come. It is inevitably difficult to place a meaningful value 
on the avoidance of such phenomena. 
 
The benefits of a reduction in the global incidence of civil war are common to all 
successful deployments of instruments for conflict reduction. They accrue at three levels: 
national, regional and global. The benefits at the national level are partly economic and 
partly social. As in Collier and Hoeffler (2004) we build a lower-bound estimate based on 
the effects of civil war on economic growth. The mortality effects are more difficult, but 
we follow their estimate in terms of DALYs. Where we depart most radically from that 
previous study is in allowing for the possibility of a much wider range of costs. These are 
by their nature far less quantifiable than the direct consequences for GDP and mortality, 
but they are likely to be large. We therefore work with both the economic costs 
considered by Collier and Hoeffler, treating this as a lower-bound, and a more 
speculative figure which we suggest may nevertheless better illustrate the centre-of-the-




pertinent analogies with other catastrophic phenomena, will begin to place better bounds 
on these effects.  
 
Stabilizing post-conflict situations 
 
Within the challenge of reducing the global incidence of civil war, we focus on post-
conflict situations. As noted above, post-conflict relapses into renewed violence account 
for around half of all global civil wars, and so they provide an opportunity for highly 
focused interventions. Further, since 2000 there have been many settlements of civil 
wars, some of which look fragile and would probably already have relapsed into violence 
but for international intervention, examples being the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Timor Leste, where as of 2008 a thousand Australian troops have been sent in 




A second opportunity is the drastic reduction of coups d’etats. Coups have been getting 
less common but they still threaten many governments of low-income countries. 
Unfortunately, as we show, democracy does not provide protection against them so that 
the rapid spread of democracy in recent years has actually increased the danger that 
democratically elected governments will be overthrown by their own militaries. While 
coups do not have anything like the high costs of civil wars, they are usually undesirable 





The major innovation of the present study is to focus on international military 
interventions as instruments for conflict reduction. Given the experience in Iraq this is 
inevitably controversial. However, as we argue below, for precisely this reason it is 
important to have a dispassionate assessment of the instrument. Iraq is likely to be an 
extremely poor guide to the utility of military instruments. To benchmark the military 
instruments we compare them to the post-conflict aid. Such aid is most probably the most 
effective use of aid for conflict reduction, though of course not necessarily the most 
effective use of aid overall. It is also politically far less controversial than military 
interventions. Hence, if post-conflict aid is as cost-effective in conflict reduction as the 
military interventions then the latter are redundant.  
 
Benchmark Instrument: Post-conflict aid 
 
Since Collier and Hoeffler (2004) much new research has enabled a better-grounded 
estimate of the benefits of post-conflict aid for reducing the risks of conflict recurrence. 
We show that there is indeed now a good case that such aid significantly and 
substantially reduces the risk of further violence. However, once we subject the 




Aid is unfortunately quite expensive relative to what it achieves unless huge values are 
placed upon the maintenance of peace.  
 
We then use this benchmark intervention to compare three much more politically 




United Nations peacekeeping interventions have increased enormously since the end of 
the Cold War and are now a massive claim on both money and manpower. Our study is 
the first attempt to provide a cost-benefit analysis of their deployment and considering 
the scale and controversy surrounding this deployment of resources such an analysis is 
surely overdue. As with most first attempts, our estimates need to be treated with due 
caution. However, our figures suggest that international peacekeeping is highly cost-
effective in securing peace.  
 
Over-the-horizon security guarantees 
 
An important variant on international peacekeeping is the strategy of over-the-horizon 
guarantees. This is the strategy currently being adopted in Sierra Leone where an in-
country military force of only 80 international troops is supported by a credible logistical 
commitment to fly troops in should they be needed. A similar, though less explicit 
arrangement appears to be in place between Timor Leste and Australia.   
 
Caps on Military Spending 
 
Our third military-related instrument is for a donor cap on military spending by 
governments of post-conflict societies. While this is evidently controversial, we show 
that because aid inadvertently leaks into such military spending, at present the lack of a 
cap inflates spending. More importantly, we show that in the post-conflict context 
military spending sharply increases the risk of further conflict so that discouraging it not 
only restores aid to its intended uses but directly reduces the risk of conflict. Such limits 
on spending are an example of a wider family of interventions aimed at reducing 
armaments in conflict-prone regions, another such instrument being limits on the arms 
trade. While there is indeed now some evidence that cheap guns increase the risk of 
violence in these societies, there is less evidence that instruments that try to limit 
armaments such as trade embargoes are actually effective. We have selected the spending 
cap as being the instrument which may be the most straightforward to implement 







The need for security from political violence is fundamental to human society. The great 
archaeological legacies of antiquity, such as the Great Wall of China, and the massive 
barrier constructed by the ancient Jutes against the Germanic tribes, stand as an enduring 
testimony to the overwhelming priority afforded to defence. This priority continued until 
very recently: for forty years the richest society on earth, America, devoted 10% of its 
national income to defence spending to meet the security threat from the Soviet Union. 
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union an era is over. Political violence has not 
passed into history, but it now happens ‘elsewhere’. Rich countries no longer fight each 
other, and they no longer fight themselves. Among the middle-income countries war has 
virtually disappeared. Even the big poor countries are now pretty safe: China and India 
have massive armies, but they haven’t used them against each other for over forty years. 
 
But some places are still dangerous. Usually, the violence is internal: the country tears 
itself apart while the rest of the world watches. Sometimes the violence draws others in, 
mostly the neighbours, and sometimes the local regional power. Occasionally the 
international powers intervene: to prevent internal mayhem, as in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, to expel an invader, as in Iraq 1, or to force regime change, as in 
Iraq 2. The uncomfortable fact is that a large group of impoverished little countries are 
structurally dangerous. Quite where the violence erupts is usually unpredictable, but its 
incidence is predictable. Just as the security problem for the previous generation was the 
containment of the Soviet Union, so for our generation the problem is the curtailment of 
violence in these societies. We begin with a review of global trends in armed conflict, 
based on recent research at the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University. 
 
Global Trends in Armed Conflict  
 
We rely upon the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition of an armed 
conflict: 
a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over which 
the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths 
each year.  
 
As noted in the overview, intrastate (civil) conflict is the most common form of armed 
conflict, and this has been so since the end of the Second World War. Despite the current 
prominence of Iraq, interstate wars (fought between at least two countries) have been 
relatively rare events. Until 1991 the number of armed conflicts trended upward but since 
then there has been a general trend towards peace. Correspondingly, the number of very 
large wars has diminished, but there are now more small wars. However, ‘small’ may be 
deceptive. The measure used is battle-related deaths. However, the increasing 




combatants, implies that even ‘small’ wars measured in battle deaths can have highly 
adverse consequences for the societies in which they occur.   
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Source: Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007. 
 
 
The geographic distribution of conflict has also changed. There has been a substantial 
decline in the number of conflicts fought in Europe and the Americas. Conflict in the 
Middle East has been relatively stable. In recent years most conflicts have been fought in 
Asia and Africa. Indeed, most conflicts are geographically grouped: two ellipses, one 
stretching from Turkey to the Philippines and the other in the Great Lakes and Horn of 
Africa, illustrate the transnational nature of civil conflict.  
 
While the total number of active conflicts has been fairly constant in recent years, this 
does not imply that new conflicts have not broken out: new conflicts have replaced the 
ones that have ended. Nine of the 32 conflicts active in 2005 had been inactive in the 
previous year, and in 2006 there were a further four new active conflicts. All of the these 
new conflicts in 2005 and 2006 were conflict relapses, further emphasizing the 
















1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
All conflicts New conflicts
1950-2006
Number of conflicts and of new conflicts
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The increase in the number of conflicts up to 1992 was not due to an increase in new 
conflicts, but rather to a gradual accumulation: few conflicts ended. It is this that has 
changed since 1992. The main reason for the encouraging reversal of trend is a 
considerable increase in successful termination of conflicts. It is thus timely to 
concentrate, as is done in this paper, on interventions which attempt to prevent these 
many recent terminations from reigniting.  
 
The Consequences of Violent Internal Conflict 
 
One contribution of this paper is to attempt to measure the cost of violent internal 
conflict. Since we focus on the prevention of repeat conflicts we consider the typical cost 
in a small, low-income country that has already had a war. Even if we include only the 
direct loss of income and ignore mortality and morbidity effects, the cost is around 
$43bn. Including mortality and morbidity the costs rise to close to $60bn. However, these 
estimates, though large, grossly understate the true cost because they make no allowance 
for five important considerations. These omissions reflect limitations both or our own 
work and of the economic methodologies currently available. It is therefore important 
that we should state them right at the outset of our study.  
 
The first omission is that the people affected by violent internal conflict tend 
disproportionately to be among the poorest and most disadvantaged people in the world. 




methodology indeed allows such considerations to be included in a global comparative 
analysis: in effect, a dollar added to the income of a person on very low income should be 
valued more highly than a dollar added to the income of a person at a higher level of 
income. Conventional economic estimates of the diminishing utility of income, derived 
from observed behaviour towards risk, suggest that the required adjustment is large. 
However, it may be best made once different proposals are compared: in effect, the 
income level of the beneficiaries of each proposal should be taken into account. The 
income level of the beneficiaries of the maintenance of post-conflict peace is, however, 
likely to be lower than that from other proposals. Thus, comparisons based on the implicit 
assumption that they have the same income as the beneficiaries of other proposals should 
be revised accordingly. The income differential between the typical citizen in the 
countries of the ‘bottom billion’ and a typical citizen of the other developing countries is 
already around one-to-five (Collier, 2007).
i Even within the ‘bottom billion’ there is a 
wide range of incomes with those countries that have recently been in conflict grouped 
right at the bottom. Further, interventions need to be guided not just by current poverty 
but by reasonable estimates of future poverty (Wood, 2006). For example, an intervention 
which this year permanently alleviates the poverty of one thousand people in China is 
simply less valuable than an intervention with the same effect in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, not because Chinese people should be less valued than the Congolese but 
because the prospects for the Chinese are manifestly more promising. As Wood argues, 
in some sense our interventions should have the objective of alleviating future misery, 
appropriately discounted. This makes successful interventions in environments that 
otherwise offer little hope much more valuable than those in societies that are already 
succeeding. He shows formally that within the Collier and Dollar (2002) analytic 
framework for optimal aid allocation, these dynamic considerations have large 
consequences: far more aid should go towards the slowest-growing countries. Since 1980 
the income of the typical citizen of the bottom billion has been diverging from the typical 
citizen of the next four billion by around 5% per year. As we show below, slow growth is 
itself a significant risk factor in violent conflict, so that the most violence-prone countries 
are systematically among the slowest growing.  
 
The second omission is that because peace is fundamental to development, its absence 
frustrates all other potential interventions. For example, the vaccination of children or the 
reliable provision of anti-retroviral drugs is virtually impossible in wartime conditions. 
Sometimes this creates ‘weakest link’ problems in the provision of global public goods. 
For example, smallpox was eliminated globally in a country-by-country campaign which 
was evidently a race against time: until it is eliminated everywhere there is a risk that it 
will break back out as a global disease. The last country on earth where it was eliminated 
was Somalia during the 1970s. Had it not been eliminated in Somalia before the society 
collapsed into civil war, smallpox would still be a global disease. From 1993 to 2007 the 
absence of security in Somalia made similar global health advances infeasible. The 
maintenance of peace is thus a logically prior investment which opens the possibility of 
all the other interventions. Conceptually, within the formal analysis of modern 
economics, the opened possibilities should be thought of as having an ‘option value’. The 
concept of an option value was developed in financial economics to show that the true 




enabled other investment opportunities to be taken as they arose, but the idea generalizes 
to any action that is necessary for other possibilities. Hence, the discovery of other 
promising uses for global resources is more likely to enhance the case for investment in 
post-conflict peace than to compete with it: few interventions are not dependent upon 
peace.  
 
The third omission is that the costs of civil war are concentrated within a society. The 
‘methodological individualism’ inherent in economic analysis essentially treats the costs 
as being the same whether the losers are spatially and socially dispersed across a 
continent, or constitute a distinct political and social unit. Yet in some sense the collapse 
of a society is far more disturbing than were the same individuals to experience the same 
suffering as isolated individuals in other societies. In effect, a well-functioning nation and 
its society generate public goods both for its members and for the world that are disrupted 
if it implodes into sustained internal violence. A useful thought experiment that reveals 
this idea is to ask what would be lost if all the citizens of, say, Ghana, were to move to 
the USA and Europe. Each individual ex-Ghanaian might be happier yet the world might 
reasonably consider that it had lost something of value. Just as species of animals and 
plants are now recognized to have an ‘existence value’ so do societies. The convulsions 
that have occurred in Somalia and Rwanda may well have gone beyond destroying the 
‘existence value’ of their societies. These societies were not erased from global 
consciousness, which is the counterfactual implied by existence value, but rather they 
became nightmares. An analogy here is the consequences of terrorism. The direct damage 
done by terrorist attacks is manifestly trivial relative to the resources devoted to 
countering them. Yet the deployment of large resources to counter-terrorist measures 
need not be mistaken if a value is assigned to the horror and revulsion which people who 
are neither victims nor potential victims feel once an attack occurs.    
 
The fourth omission is that the costs of internal conflict are highly persistent. This 
persistence raises two issues for quantification, just how long do the adverse effects last, 
and how should the future be valued relative to the present? We base our cost estimates 
on the duration of a typical civil war being seven years and the recovery back to normal 
taking around fourteen years. While these figures are based on evidence rather than being 
assumptions, we have deliberately been conservative in adopting figures at the lower end 
of the reasonable range. Even the duration of internal conflict is surprisingly difficult to 
estimate and one distinguished study puts it at fifteen years as opposed to the seven we 
use here. Similarly, a new study on the path of exports after civil war finds that even after 
a quarter of a century, following a large war there is still no sign of recovery from the 
collapse that occurs during the war. It has also been shown that the collapse in health 
conditions that occurs during war is highly persistent. The valuation of the future relative 
to the present is standard in economics, by means of discounting. However, as the Stern 
Report has recently argued in connection with the costs of climate change, the valuation 
of the future becomes more problematic when the effects are inter-generational and their 
magnitude large. Stern argues that in such circumstances it is appropriate to discount the 
future less heavily than is appropriate for short-horizon, marginal investments. Both of 
these qualifications apply to the costs of violent internal conflict. The degree to which the 




because some of the costs are two decades or more into the future. In our estimates for 
this study we have discounted future effects at 3% and 6% per year, but these may both 
be higher than is warranted once the effects highlighted by Stern are considered. Hence, 
both due to the potential for highly persistent costs, and to the case for a less severe 
discount on the future, we are likely to have under-estimated the cost of violence. 
 
Our final omission is of three global spill-over effects: crime, disease and terrorism. 
Large-scale political violence and the resulting breakdown of the state create territories 
that have a comparative advantage in international criminality. They provide safe havens 
both for criminals themselves and for their material activities such as the storage of 
illegal commodities, notably drugs. Some 95% of hard drug production is concentrated in 
civil war or post-conflict environments. They socialize young men into violence and 
provide powerful ‘push’ incentives for them to emigrate to societies in which they are 
then liable to be predatory. We omit these costs from our core quantification partly 
because the link between violence and criminality is not one-to-one: some peaceful 
societies can nevertheless be quasi-criminal states, as for example Guinea-Bissau. A 
second reason is that the costs are highly speculative because the counterfactual is 
unclear: to what extent would criminality merely shift and to what extent would it be 
curtailed. The third reason is that the cost of international criminality is enormous, so that 
any reasonable number would be both speculative and large. Civil wars also create the 
conditions for the spread of disease: the breakdown in public health systems and the mass 
movement of refugees. Some of this spread of disease affects neighbours, and potentially 
it can also affect the entire world. One of the explanations for the origin of AIDS for 
which there is some evidence is that it originated during an African civil war. Again, we 
exclude the risk of such a pandemic from our core estimate of costs for the same reasons 
as crime: there is again no one-to-one connection, and since the damage of a pandemic is 
enormous our results would be dominated by a highly speculative number. Finally, civil 
wars appear to assist terrorism. Al Qaida based its training camps in Afghanistan because 
the absence of a recognized government was convenient. Similarly, the American 
government finally decided that leaving Somalia without a recognized government was 
too dangerous, once evidence built up that Al Qaida was relocating there. We exclude the 
risk that civil war will assist international terrorism: there is no one-to-one link, and we 
would again have a huge but speculative number driving our calculations.  
 
Should all five of these factors simply be ignored when estimating the benefits of peace? 
It seems to us unreasonable to do so. If on average each factor implied that the true costs 
were double the number generated by neglecting it, then cumulatively the five would 
imply a 32-fold increase in the valuation of the cost of conflict! If the average adjustment 
was 50% it would imply a 7.5-fold increase, and if it were only 20% a 2.5-fold increase. 
Can we make any judgment on the magnitude of the likely adjustment? The first 
omission, that conflict affected people are the poorest and least hopeful people on earth, 
surely warrants a large adjustment. Both the evidence from estimates of typical utility 
functions and the simulations of Wood (2006) suggest that the required adjustment is 
more likely to involve doubling than alterations by a few percentage points. For the other 
factors there is even less guidance, but doubling would seem to be unwarranted. Were 




double our estimate as an adjustment to the first omission, the overall adjustment would 
be a 4.2-fold increase, implying a cost of the typical civil war of the order of $250bn.  
 
Evidently, the leap from the estimate of $60bn to that of $250bn is speculative. We 
therefore leave it to the reader to judge between them. The $60bn estimate essentially 
treats a prolonged civil war as broadly analogous to an economic recession with some 
added illness. In our view the $250bn figure better approximates to how ordinary people 
view civil war. It is, for example, more commensurate with the scale of resources the 
governments of developed countries are periodically willing to deploy to attempt to 
change political regimes for the better. In our subsequent analysis we will use the figure 
of $60bn as being the likely lower bound, and that of $250bn as an illustrative figure 
which is probably closer to the centre of the range.   
 
International Policy Options: Abstention versus Intervention 
 
What, if anything, should be done internationally to address this security problem? Some 
very able scholars argue that within these societies autonomous processes will correct it, 
so that external strategies are unnecessary (Weinstein, 2005). Others argue to the same 
effect that external interventions are illegitimate, ineffective, or even counter-productive. 
However, benign neglect can itself backfire. When Somalia collapsed into anarchy in 
1993 it was allowed to remain without a government for fourteen years. Only once there 
was evidence that Al Qaida had moved in to the resulting safe haven was international 
action organized to impose a new government. Perhaps, if Somalia had been left on its 
own for a century, it would have developed a viable government without external 
assistance. But, perhaps not: little very recognizable as a national government had 
emerged in mainland Africa in the centuries prior to external intervention. Small, 
impoverished societies tend to be structurally insecure: insecurity is a trap from which it 
is difficult to escape without assistance from beyond the society, although the 
intervention may come from neighbours, as in the end it did with Somalia, rather than 
from the developed world.   
 
There are two reasons why external security intervention should be afforded a high 
priority: compassion and self-interest. The argument from compassion is that the insecure 
societies are the poorest and most desperate environments on earth, and that the provision 
of security is fundamental both to personal wellbeing and to economic development. 
Without security a society can hardly get started. The benefits of security provision are 
thus both particularly well-targeted on the most needy societies, and have good prospects 
of being geared up by making other interventions feasible. The argument from 
compassion is complemented by the argument from self-interest. Insecurity spills over 
across borders. As we show, most of the costs of insecurity accrue to neighbours rather 
than to the society directly effected, and so neighbourhoods have both an interest and a 
right to be involved. And some of the costs spill over to rich societies. Broken societies 
are havens for illegality, whether this is trafficking in drugs or training of terrorists. The 
argument from self-interest is compatible with the argument from compassion: most 
commonly enlightened self-interest is a vital spur to effective solutions. However, on its 




solutions. The high profile of the terror risk facing rich countries has tended to crowd out 
the rather different security challenges facing the failing societies. A discourse on 
international security that does not address these challenges is one-sided and less likely to 
gain acceptance. In fact, the security challenge facing rich countries is in large part a 
side-effect of the much larger security challenge facing the failing societies. A sustained 
strategy of strengthening these societies against structural insecurity is likely to be more 
worthwhile than that of neglect interspersed with invasions if ‘they’ appear to threaten 
‘us’.   
 
Although the core of this paper focuses on a few specific interventions we should stress 
that we do not see these as the only means of enhancing security in these societies. 
Rather, they are one part of a wide array of desirable interventions. Each gains both 
effectiveness and acceptability by being part of the whole. Precisely because the military 
interventions highlighted here are inevitably going to be regarded as controversial, we 
wish to make clear that we are not advocating military-only approaches. What would a 
comprehensive strategy of addressing structural insecurity look like? We can get some 
insights from the successful sustained security strategy of countering the threat posed by 
the Soviet Union. That threat was taken seriously and infused a wide array of policies. 
Not only was 10% of US income devoted to security for over forty years. The pre-war 
policy of isolationism was torn up: America created NATO, the system of mutual 
security guarantees, and placed over one hundred thousand troops in Europe. The serious 
response went well beyond security measures: America reversed its protectionist trade 
policy, integrating a fragile post-war Europe into its own powerhouse economy by 
dismantling trade barriers. Nor did getting serious stop with trade: America launched a 
giant aid program to Europe: Marshall Aid. American responses to the security challenge 
even extended to how its allies governed themselves. No viable strategy was neglected. 
Even with this massive response it took over forty years of sustained effort. Is the 
challenge facing our generation greater or less than that? It is clearly less stark: The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is not pointing missiles at Washington. The 
amorphous nature of the threat is closer to the security challenge at the end of the First 
World War. As Macmillan (2006) notes, this was one reason why in 1919 the 
peacemakers failed to resolve the core security challenge. The amorphous nature of the 
current security risk has led to wild swings in Western response. Somalia was an instance 
of total neglect whereas Iraq 2 is at the opposite end of the spectrum: pre-emptive total 
intervention. The lesson of how America saw off the threat from the Soviet Union is that 
for challenges of this scale to be ‘winnable’ the major nations of the international 
community need to apply a consistent set of policies for a long time. Security and 
compassion are not rivals here, they can coalesce into a sense of common purpose.  
 
The Quantitative Analysis of Security 
 
This paper does not provide a comprehensive menu of policies that might effectively 
address structural insecurity, but it provides a quantitative analysis of some salient 
possibilities. Quantitative analysis is vital in order to move discussion beyond political 
posturing. Inevitably, issues of security are difficult to get into a quantitative framework 




Our instinct is to say that the immense expenditures on countering the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union proved to be well-justified, but that sense depends upon a counterfactual: 
what would have happened without this expenditure, and in particular what probability to 
place upon the more dire among the possible scenarios. Compared to the security 
expenditure during the Cold War, the security expenditures considered in this paper are 
far more amenable to quantification. This is because dire scenarios are not hypothetical: 
the forms of insecurity of concern to failing states occur with sufficient frequency to be 
analyzable as statistical phenomena. We are thus able to quantify the factors which make 
societies more or less prone to these forms of political violence. Some of the factors that 
make a society prone to violence do not directly provide fruitful opportunities for policy 
intervention. For example, societies in countries with a lot of mountainous terrain face a 
much higher risk of rebellion, most probably because such terrain facilitates the 
organization of rebellion. Yet levelling mountains is not a sensible strategy. However, 
other risk factors are more amenable to policy and these provide the foundation for 
estimating the costs and benefits of interventions that marginally reduce risks. 
 
Marginal analysis may not seem very exciting, but it is the essence of policy analysis. 
Security is all about risks, and so the pay-offs to effective interventions are indeed going 
to be measured as reductions in risks. These changes in risk will then be multiplied by the 
consequences of counterfactual scenarios that become more and less likely. Analytically, 
our approach will be equivalent to the way the costs and benefits of any expenditure on 
risk-reduction, such as safety belts in vehicles. The benefits of fitting the belt are the 
reduced chance of severe injury times some cost in terms of loss in the quality of life 
should such an injury occur. These benefits then have to be weighed against the cost. 
Such calculations, involving both the estimation of changes in risk and the valuation of 
counterfactual scenarios, are a routine part of cost-benefit analysis. The application of 
this approach to the structural insecurity of failing states involves no departure of 
principle, but it indisputably gives rise to a culture shock among both political scientists 
and economists. Political scientists, who are familiar with thinking about the issues of 
failing states, often grow uncomfortable when faced with quantification. There is, of 
course, good reason for concern that quantification necessarily sets aside the myriad of 
factors that cannot be quantified. Economists, for whom quantification is entirely normal, 
often grow uncomfortable for a different reason: failing states are a phenomenon for 
which data are poor and so they worry that there is insufficient basis for quantitative 
analysis. Both of these concerns are reasonable. A cost-benefit analysis of security 
strategies should be seen as one approach that can help to supplement the way in which 
decisions are made rather than being the only basis for those decisions. Nevertheless, it 
can hardly be claimed that the record of decisions on insecurity interventions in failing 
states is so impressive that not such supplement is warranted. Purely qualitative analysis 
has its own catastrophic pitfalls. The precise numbers generated in this paper are fragile, 
but where possible we indicate the likely range.  
 
The key security challenges facing poor countries are civil wars and coups. Currently, the 
governments that face these risks respond to them by military spending. Both the risks 
and the response are highly costly. If there are cost-effective international interventions 




the payoff to poor countries would be enormous. Yet even among the international 
interventions designed to help such countries, security has received less policy attention 
than the ‘photogenic’ topics like health and education. International security 
interventions, though numerous and expensive, have not been guided by cost-benefit 
analysis. Especially with the establishment in September 2005 of a permanent UN Peace-
building Commission, there is a real opportunity for more informed and coherent 
international action. There is the potential to build on recent advances in the quantitative 
study of security issues in poor countries as exemplified by the contributions to the new 
Handbook of Defence Economics, (Hartley and Sandler, 2007).  
  
We first estimate the costs of these phenomena in poor countries and then investigate four 
possible ways of ameliorating them: increasing aid in post-conflict situations; imposing 
limits on the military spending of post-conflict governments; expanding peacekeeping 
forces; and guaranteeing security from ‘over-the-horizon’. The results presented here are 
new rather than a repetition of the previous challenge paper for the Copenhagen 
Consensus, although they build upon that work (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Since that 
paper was written there have been substantial advances in the quantitative analysis of 
conflict, and of the efficacy of potential interventions. Specifically, there have been 
quantitative analyses of how military spending, aid, coups, the risk of war and 
peacekeeping forces are interlinked using more recent data. These new studies provide 
the foundations for estimates of the costs and benefits of the four proposed interventions. 
Since these are the first such estimates they have a dual function. Most directly, they can 
inform policy: even ballpark figures of costs and benefits provide guidance as to the 
absolute and relative merits of interventions that are already sometimes deployed. 
Beyond this direct effect, we hope that our estimates open up a new area for future 
researchers so that over time this further research will reveal the credible range of 
answers. 
 
II: The scourges: civil wars and coups 
 
Structural insecurity has various manifestations and we do not attempt to address them 
all. The major forms of insecurity are international wars, such as that between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea; civil wars, such as that within Sudan; pogroms perpetrated by the 
government against its own civilians, such as happened in Rwanda; community-level 
violence between different ethnic, religious or political groups, such as recently occurred 
in Northern Nigeria; and coups d’etats, such as occurred in Cote d’Ivoire. All these forms 
occur from time to time in the countries of ‘the bottom billion’, while having receded into 
history in the developed societies. We will focus only on civil wars and coups. There are 
two reasons for this restriction of focus. First, each of these five phenomena is quite 
distinct and requires a separate analysis. It is inappropriate as far as quantitative and 
policy analysis are concerned either to amalgamate them into some amorphous aggregate 
of ‘insecurity’, or to assume that what is true of one category will extend to the others. 
Our research has concentrated upon civil wars and coups, and it would require major 
further research to extend to the other forms of violence. Second, while all these forms 
are periodically of importance, civil wars are unambiguously the most costly: they are 




potentially of importance far beyond their direct disruption, because they either usher in 
or prolong military rule. Hence, the costs of coups are, at least in part, the obverse of the 
gains from democracy. Not all coups oust democratic governments, and some even lead 
to democracy. But on the whole, coups empower the military over civilian government. 
The fear of a coup can also generate costs: as we will see, governments sometimes 
increase military spending in order to pre-empt a coup attempt. Thus, coups are costly 




For the purposes of undertaking a cost-benefit analysis of strategies to reduce the 
incidence of civil war, we need two components. One is the cost of the typical civil war, 
and the other is a quantitative analysis of the factors that cause civil war. 
 
The costs of civil war 
 
The full consequences of civil war are so various that it is not practical to quantify them 
all. We therefore focus on the salient costs while considering whether those factors we 
omit are likely to be so important as to nullify our analysis.  
 
The most readily measurable costs are the economic damage done to the country during 
the war. Even this depends upon some hypothesized counterfactual of how the country’s 
economy would have evolved in the absence of war. Such counterfactuals are generated 
from multi-country growth regressions. The approach is to introduce into such standard 
growth regressions a dummy variable which picks up the typical effect of civil war. This 
was the approach taken in Collier (1998), who estimated that civil war typically reduced 
a country’s growth rate by around 2.2 percentage points for the duration of the conflict. 
Since that study there have been various other estimates. One genuine difficulty is 
whether to attribute some of the costs not to the war itself but to the damaging economic 
policies that governments commonly adopt during war: while these policies are usual in 
wartime they can also occur during peace and so potentially the pure costs of war could 
be seen as distinct from the costs of bad policies. Collier (1998) treats the costs of war-
related policies as part of the costs of war and that will be our approach here. The figure 
of 2.2% remains around the centre of the range of estimates. Note that it implies that in 
most countries even during a civil war the economy keeps growing, so that simple 
before-and-after comparisons would radically under-state the costs. Since the typical civil 
war lasts around seven years, by its end the economy is typically around 15% poorer than 
it would have been with peace. 
 
Evidently, the next issue is what happens once the war is over. If the economy were to 
persist in being 15% poorer than it would have been then almost all the costs of war 
would occur after it was over. In fact, the typical post-conflict economy gradually 
recovers to its pre-war growth path. The recovery has been estimated by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004b) and by Elbadawi et al (forthcoming). As a rule of thumb, the recovery 
takes about twice as long as the war itself: destruction is more rapid than reconstruction. 




per year relative to counterfactual, followed by a recovery at around 1.1% for fourteen 
years. New research on more detailed aspects of post-conflict recovery broadly supports 
this pattern. For example, Martin and Mayer (forthcoming) investigates the recovery in 
the share of exports in GDP which unsurprisingly collapses during civil war. They find 
that for the majority of civil wars, namely those where combat-related deaths are 
moderate, it takes around 18 years to get back to normal. Similarly, Adam et al. (2008) 
investigate the recovery in the demand for domestic currency which also declines during 
civil war as governments resort to desperate measures of financing which undermines 
confidence. They find that typically it takes up to two decades fully to restore confidence 
in the currency. This pattern of economic collapse during war followed by slow recovery 
creates a V-shaped path for income relative to counterfactual. If both this path and the 
counterfactual path are depicted graphically, the difference between them is a triangle 
showing the losses due to the war. By discounting the area of this triangle we arrive at 
our first component of the cost of civil war: the NPV of the cost of a war to the country 
affected. 
 
However, countries have neighbours and in the modern global economy national 
economies are sufficiently interconnected that wars are likely to create spill-over effects. 
Potentially, these effects could be positive. For example, the recent troubles in Zimbabwe 
have shifted tourist business for the Victoria Falls to the Zambian side of the river. 
However, the more likely effects are negative. We have estimated the effects to 
neighbours and find that they are indeed predominantly negative (Chauvet, Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2006). The approach we used was again standard, although care has to be taken 
to distinguish those neighbourhood effects which have nothing to do with war from war 
itself. For example, a neighbourhood might be affected in common by a drought as in 
Southern Africa during the mid-1990s. We find, unsurprisingly, that the costs to any 
particular neighbour are considerably less than the costs to the country itself. Typically, a 
country might lose around 0.9 percentage points off its growth rate if one of its 
neighbours is at war. However, the typical civil war country has three or more neighbours 
and further the economies of the neighbouring countries are usually larger than that of the 
civil war country itself. This is because, as we will see, being small and poor are both risk 
factors. In our subsequent analysis we include only costs to immediate neighbours. 
However, this omits demonstrated adverse spill-over effects across a wider area. 
Murdoch and Sandler (2002) show that the adverse effects on growth permeate the entire 
sub-region, not just neighbours, perhaps due to reputation and trade effects. Even with the 
restriction to immediate neighbours, the numbers imply that the costs to the neighbours as 
a group are likely to be even larger than the costs to the country at war. This has wide-
ranging implications. Evidently, if most of the costs of a civil war accrue to neighbours 
then they have a strong interest in peace and may be seen as having legitimate rights in 
actions that encourage both conflict avoidance and the settlement of wars. Untrammelled 
national sovereignty may not be appropriate in these conditions. 
 
While a rethinking of sovereignty evidently lies beyond the scope of the present paper, 
the issue bears sufficiently on international strategies for limiting civil war that it 
warrants some discussion. The delineation of national sovereignty limits the set of 




international interventions, rests on a view of what concept of sovereignty would be 
appropriate, and this in turn is based on the research reported here. Historically, the entire 
concept of national sovereignty arose out of the Thirty Years War, largely because of a 
perception that whatever wrongs a government perpetrated on its own population they 
had little effect upon the wellbeing of other countries. At the time the concept was 
developed in the seventeenth century there were reasonable grounds for such a 
proposition: economies and societies were not highly integrated. Nowadays, however, at 
least in the case of a civil war in a small country with many neighbours, the externalities 
are too large to be dismissed in this way. The United Nations has recently formulated a 
proposition known as the ‘responsibility to protect’ which in effect suggests that the 
international community has the right to intervene to protect the citizens from their own 
government. Compared with that proposition, the notion that the neighbours of a country 
at risk of civil war have a right to protect their own citizens is surely modest. If the 
neighbourhood externalities are approximately as large as the effects on the country 
itself, which is one of our results, then for sovereignty to be shared by the neighbourhood 
would simply reflect a standard economic solution to the problem of how externalities 
should be internalized into the decision process.   
 
While the costs of civil war are large and widespread, are they offset by gains to the 
society itself after the conflict is over? In particular, are there future political gains? 
Rebellion is often portrayed by its perpetrators as an investment in political liberation. At 
least implicitly, the costs are judged to be outweighed by the subsequent political 
benefits. Some civil wars indeed have such beneficial consequences that they surely 
outweigh the costs. However, the political legacy of civil war is on average depressing. 
Measured by political rights, the post-war period is usually worse than the pre-war 
period. Indeed, one troubling legacy that will particularly concern us is that the country 
becomes more rather than less prone to further civil war. Thus, wars do not usually 
resolve political conflicts, but rather intensify them. It is thus hard to view civil wars as 
on average generating benefits anywhere commensurate with their costs. This may raise 
the question as to why, in that case, they occur. Are rebellions mistakes? In some cases 
this indeed seems quite likely. For example, the terrible conflict raging in Western Sudan 
was triggered by a local rebellion. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of this rebellion, it 
is unthinkable that it has generated net benefits for the population on whose behalf the 
rebellion was ostensibly launched. In other cases there may be a substantial divergence 
between those who launch the war and the mass of the population. Overwhelmingly, the 
costs of conflict accrue to those who have no influence over the decision to fight, 
including neighbouring countries and those who are children at the time of the war. It is 
quite possible that the perpetrators of violence benefit from it, or have reasonable 
prospects of doing so, even if the overall net costs of conflict are enormous.  
 
We now turn to the construction of an estimate for the cost of a civil war. Our starting 
point is the loss of growth to the country and its neighbours, as discussed above. Using 
the estimated reduction in growth of 2.2%, the average duration of conflict of seven 
years, and the gradual recovery post-conflict of 1.1%, we arrive at a present value of the 
cost of conflict to the country itself of 105% of one year’s GDP, measured at the point of 





In the study undertaken for the first Copenhagen Consensus on conflict, (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004), these numbers became the underpinnings of the estimate of the cost of 
conflict. For the present study we have access to better information. In particular, the data 
on post-conflict countries is greatly improved on that available four years ago. However, 
although there is now more evidence on the consequences of conflict, the growth effects 
used in that study continue to look reasonable. Our revision of those estimates is 
therefore confined to using new data on GDP, and on constructing GDP figures that 
pertain specifically to post-conflict countries and their neighbours. We thus multiply the 
percentage losses of GDP by the GDP of the typical post-conflict country at the onset of 
peace, and the typical sum of the GDP of the neighbours of post-conflict countries. The 
former cost, which is the cost to the country directly affected, is around $20bn at PPP 
prices. The cost to neighbours is in aggregate around $23bn. It is superficially surprising 
that the cost to neighbours is of the same order of magnitude as that to the country itself. 
However, despite the smaller proportionate impact upon their economies, the neighbours 
are more numerous, each country having several neighbours, and they are also typically 
larger and richer. Recall that conflict occurs disproportionately in small economies with 
very low incomes, so that it is to be expected these differences are systematic.   
 
The combined cost of $43bn is a little lower than the estimate of Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) which was for the expected cost of an initial civil war. The cost of war recurrence 
in post-conflict settings is lower than that estimate because the economies of post-conflict 
countries are systematically smaller than average. Collier and Hoeffler then added an 
estimate for the costs of loss of life and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). In our 
estimates we adopt two values for DALYs, namely $1,000 and $5,000. With a discount 
rate of 3%, these yield an additional cost of a civil war of $13bn and $33bn respectively.  
We also estimate the figures using a 6% discount rate, yielding total war costs of $46bn 
and $66 bn. 
 
In addition to the loss of income and loss of life, civil wars divert expenditure into 
socially unproductive uses, notably military spending. During civil war military spending 
by the government increases by around 1.8 percentage points of GDP. This is evidently a 
lower bound since by its nature a civil war also involves military spending on the part of 
the rebel organization. Since there are usually no data on such spending it is not included. 
However, to give an indication of its likely scale, one middle-sized rebel group, the Tamil 
Tigers, are estimated to be spending around $350m per year, almost exclusively on 
military activities. The typical civil war lasts for around seven years, so that the increase 
in military spending during the war amounts to around 10 percentage points of GDP 
allowing for discounting. Nor is this the end of the excess military spending resulting 
from civil war. During the post-conflict decade, domestic military spending typically 
remains high. Although it is reduced from its level during the war the reduction is 
typically only around fifth of the war-induced increase. Hence, spending at around 1.5% 
of GDP in excess of normal during this decade is a further cost of around 8%. The total 
diversion of spending into military purposes resulting from the war is thus around 18% of 
a year’s GDP, even if it is assumed that thereafter spending reverts to its initial level. 





Thus, the total cost of a typical civil war in a low-income country that has already 
experienced a war is around $58.6 bn. Over the entire period since 1960 there have been 
on average around two outbreaks of civil war each year, implying a running total cost of 
the order of $123bn per year. To put this in perspective, the costs of civil wars are thus of 
the same order of magnitude as the global total of development aid. In recent years the 
number of outbreaks has been lower, but as discussed above, it is probably premature to 
see this as a new pattern.  
 
Recall from Section I that these quantified costs omit severe important considerations that 
are less readily quantified but may collectively make the quantified costs merely the tip 
of an iceberg. We suggested that for illustrative purposes a figure of $250bn per war 
might be closer to full costs and decided to work with both figures, the $59bn figure 
being a lower bound.  
 
The causes of civil war 
 
Historians are still arguing about the cause of the First World War, and the typical civil 
war is likely to be no less complicated. Our aspirations in analysing causality are more 
modest. We abstract completely from the immediate political antecedents to a civil war: 
the mistakes made by the government, the charisma of an opposition leader, the 
inflammatory statements and provocative actions on both sides. These are indeed in some 
sense the ‘causes’ of the war. Instead, our focus is on the underlying conditions which 
make countries more or less prone to civil war. In some societies these conditions are so 
ripe that relatively small errors on the part of leaders ignite large scale violence, whereas 
in others the conditions make civil war impossible regardless of what individual leaders 
do. In the last five years several economists and political scientists have applied statistical 
analysis, usually logit regressions, to establish these underlying risk factors and the 
results published in reputable, peer-reviewed journals (Hegre, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Miguel et al., 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a; Urdal, 2005). These studies 
largely agree although around the margins there are, of course, many interesting 
differences and room for dispute. There are defensible alternative choices that can be 
made as to statistical method, data sources, the variables to be included, and the 
definitions of variables. In this paper our analysis is based on the new work of Collier, 
Hoeffler and Rohner (forthcoming) which is a major update of the Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), including a comprehensive coverage of wars and an array of robustness checks.   
 
While in this paper we only need to know about those risk factors that are potentially 
amenable to policy, it is nevertheless sensible to ground our analysis in a brief overview 
of the risk factors that this approach generates. This is especially the case since many 
people presume that they understand the causes of civil war simply from the accumulated 
accounts of them given in newspapers. Such accounts generally amplify the discourse of 
ethnic grievance disseminated by the parties to the conflict, each seeking to justify its 
actions to an international audience. Rebellion is usually justified by its perpetrators in 




basis in fact to be credible, but they fall far short of actually explaining the occurrence of 
the conflict.   
 
We find that three economic characteristics make a country particularly prone to civil 
war: a low level of income, a low rate of growth, and a structure of income in which 
primary commodity exports constitute a substantial, but not overwhelming, proportion. 
Hence, those countries with all three of these characteristics: low-income, slow-growing, 
and dependent upon primary commodity exports, are decidedly at risk. In addition to 
these economic factors, social factors also matter. Societies that have a small population, 
those with many ethnic divisions, those that are mountainous, and those with a high 
proportion of youth, are at risk. ‘Small is dangerous’ only in the sense that if the same 
territory is split up into more and more countries the overall risk that somewhere on the 
territory there will be a civil war goes up sharply. It is not the case that a small society 
literally has a higher risk than a big society. These are not the only factors that are 
important. Others that are pertinent for policy will be discussed in the next section.   
Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner conclude from their results that the most reasonable 
interpretation of the risks of civil war is the ‘feasibility hypothesis’. This is that in the 
relatively unusual conditions under which civil war is militarily and financially feasible 
there is a very high probability that it will occur, although the specific agenda of the rebel 
group (or often groups) is indeterminate.  
 
The quantitative analysis of proneness to civil war, which can be thought of as a 
diagnosis, provides some basis for both prognosis and prescription. The latter is the focus 
of this paper: what international interventions look to have promise as strategies to reduce 
the incidence of civil war, and how do their likely prospective benefits compared to their 
costs. This is the subject of Part III where we focus upon a particular set of strategies for 
reducing conflict, namely international military intervention. Our reason for this choice 
of focus is primarily that it is currently the policy area where popular opinion is most in 
need of being informed by fresh evidence. Clearly, the experience of Iraq 2 has massively 
reduced both the willingness of citizens of developed countries to countenance military 
intervention in developing countries, and reduced the legitimacy of such interventions in 
the eyes of the governments of developing countries. In effect, though for different 
reasons, international opinion resembles its state in the wake of the withdrawal from 
Somalia: never intervene. Yet our research suggests that it is possible to delineate 
situations in which military intervention would be beneficial. Our contribution is thus 
intended in part to rehabilitate the concept of international military intervention from the 
highly particular circumstances of Iraq 2.  
 
Even so, we wish to emphasize that we see such intervention very much as a ‘last resort’ 
solution. To date much greater emphasis has been placed upon the prevention of violent 
conflict by means of creating the conditions for political legitimacy. In practice this has 
meant the promotion of democracy. Clearly, if the establishment of democratic forms of 
government substantially reduces the risk of political violence then it is both a more 
attractive and a less costly solution than any military-based strategy. However, so 
attractive is the democratic approach that its efficacy has, perhaps, been assumed, or 




loyalty to government. Nevertheless, that democracy reduces the incidence of political 
violence remains, in the end, a proposition the validity of which depends upon empirical 
evidence. The proposition has recently been tested in Hegre (2003), and Collier and 
Rohner (2008). They find that systematically, across a wide range of measures of 
political violence, and across different structural models of the risk of civil war, 
democracy has an ambiguous effect. In particular, they find that below a threshold level 
of income democracy significantly increases the risk of violence whereas above the 
threshold it has the opposite effect. Thus, in low-income countries democracy seems not 
to be the key solution to political violence, and indeed seems likely to intensify the 
problem of maintaining peace. Collier and Rohner suggest that the explanation for these 
results may be that democracy has two opposing effects. Its legitimacy effect, whereby 
citizens accept the authority of an elected government, may be stronger in societies that 
are more educated or have other characteristics commonly associated with higher levels 
of income. Offsetting this, democracy makes government repression more difficult, and 
while this is in itself an attractive consequence of democracy, it might weaken a strategy 
of maintaining the peace that governments in low-income countries find particularly 
effective. This form of security, sometimes referred to as ‘the peace of the zoo’, might 
nevertheless have some attractions if the alternative is civil war. There is some evidence 
that it is effective at least against some forms of political violence, and that democracy 
curtails resort to repression. However, these are not exhaustive explanations. Neither we 
nor Collier and Rohner mean to imply by these results that democracy is inappropriate for 
low-income countries. Rather, our argument is that the comfortable belief that the 
genuinely high security risks facing small, low-income countries with particular social 
and geographic characteristics can be resolved purely by political means is probably not 
well-founded. The evidence points to the need for international interventions to address 
these security concerns.  
 
Even if this is accepted it does not imply that international military intervention is an 
appropriate form of international assistance. Recent quantitative research suggests that 
two types of international intervention have promise: economic and military. The key 
economic interventions are aid, supportive trade policies, and the promulgation of 
standards and codes pertinent for the specific characteristics of risk-prone countries such 
as the management of natural resource revenues. These were the main focus of our 





While prescription is our goal, prognosis is also pertinent. If other developments in the 
global economy and polity are in any case gradually reducing the incidence of civil war 
then the problem may not require the scarce commodity of global cooperation. 
Unfortunately, three major recent international developments have raised the risk of new 
outbreaks of civil war. 
 
One development is the commodity booms and the consequent discovery of valuable 




that of Fearon and Laitin suggest that this will tend to increase risks of violence. A recent 
example is the extraction of oil from Chad, which came on stream in 2004 and can 
credibly be linked to both rebellion and coup attempts in the following year. Oil 
discoveries are proliferating in ‘fragile’ states, because high prices have boosted 
exploration and politically difficult territories are the major remaining unexploited areas. 
For example, in 2007 oil was discovered beneath the lake between Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, an area that has already suffered substantial violence 
and where the border is ill-defined. In addition to the consequences of new discoveries, 
there are also concerns over the long term consequences of high commodity prices for 
economic development. If there is a ‘resource curse’ then the damage done to the 
economy will itself increase the risk of conflict. Collier and Goderis (2007, 2007a)) use a 
co-integration approach to investigate the short and long run effects of high commodity 
prices on the growth of commodity exporters. They base their analysis on global data for 
the period 1970-2003. They find that for the first few years high commodity prices 
significantly boost the growth of constant price GDP so that income is augmented both 
directly by terms of trade improvement and indirectly through the growth of output. 
However, after this initial boost most countries experience sustained and substantial 
economic contraction: there is indeed a powerful ‘resource curse’. Simulating the present 
commodity booms in Africa they project an eventual decline in constant price GDP 
relative to counterfactual by around 25%. The decline is not inevitable but is contingent 
upon initial levels of governance. Governance is a slippery concept to measure, but they 
use data from the International Country Risk Guide. An advantage of this measure is that 
it is a long-standing commercial service which, since companies continue to buy it, can 
be presumed to have some informational content. So measured, a commodity exporter 
with good governance, such as Norway, completely avoids the resource curse and grows 
as a result of the boom both in the short term and the long term. The critical level below 
which governance is not adequate to harness the long term growth potential of 
commodity rents is unfortunately rather high - around that of Portugal in the mid-1980s. 
Most of the low-income countries currently experiencing commodity booms have 
standards of governance well below this level. Both the scale of the current commodity 
booms and these research results on the resource curse vindicate the proposal made in the 
previous Copenhagen Consensus paper on conflict to support the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international attempt to improve the standards of 
governance of resource revenues. While the proposal was not prioritized by the panel of 
judges, the international community subsequently indeed decisively scaled up EITI. In 
2007 it turned what had begun as a small NGO campaign into an official international 
organization headquartered in Oslo. Our concern here, however, is not to revive this 
former proposal but simply to note the likely consequences of the commodity booms for 
the global incidence of conflict and hence guide the prioritization of conflict among the 
other competing claims on international resources.   
 
The second development is the large number of recently negotiated peace settlements. 
While these are at least in the short term a triumph of international diplomacy, research, 
both quantitative and qualitative, finds that negotiated settlements have historically faced 
a high risk of relapse (Walter, 2001; Nilsson, 2008). This implication of the recent spate 




prognosis is entirely reasonable on the historical data, an alternative optimistic 
interpretation would be that the new international political will to prevent civil war has 
decisively changed behaviour. 
 
The third development is the proliferation of democracy across low-income states since 
the 1990s. Most low-income countries are now at least partially democratic. As 
discussed, Collier and Rohner (2008) find that this seems likely to increase rather than 
reduce the incidence of civil war, and similar concerns about democracy in low-income 
countries is much more general in the political science literature. The specific results of 
Collier and Rohner are consistent with previous research by Hegre, while other political 
scientists propose that the problem arises because intermediate levels of democracy 
(‘anocracy’) are more dangerous than autocracy. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2008) 
examine the consequences of elections in post-conflict situations for the continuing 
maintenance of peace. Their general analysis of post-conflict risks is discussed more fully 
in a subsequent section, so here we focus purely on this particular result. They find that 
post-conflict elections have systematic effects on risk, but they are not particularly 
encouraging. Although in the year prior to the election the risk of reversion to conflict 
falls sharply, in the year after the election it increases even more sharply, so that the net 
effect is risk-increasing. Recent research has also investigated whether elections in low-
income countries with very poor economic policies and governance accelerate or retard 
the process of reform (Chauvet and Collier, 2007, 2008). It finds that the overall effects 
are ambiguous, but that echoing the specifically conflict-related concerns about 
‘anocracy’, semi-democracy retards reform even relative to its slow pace under 
autocracy. There is also both micro and macro evidence that commodity booms and 
democracy interact adversely. Vicente (2006) compares Sao Tome and Cap Verde, two 
similar islands off the West African coast, both formerly Portuguese. The discovery of oil 
in Sao Tome creates a ‘natural experiment’. He shows that following the oil discovery 
government corruption rapidly increased in Sao Tome relative to that in Cap Verde. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2006a) investigate the macro-statistical interaction of democracy 
and natural resource rents using global data. They find that whereas in the absence of 
resource rents democracy improves economic performance, with large resource rents 
democracy substantially worsens it. In effect, instead of democracy disciplining the use 
of resource rents, the rents undermine the functioning of democracy. The critical level of 
resource rents above which democracy has adverse effects is around 8% of GDP, so that 
the current resource booms have lifted many low-income resource exporters well above 
this threshold.  
 
These three major recent developments, the commodity boom, negotiated settlements, 
and democratization, are between them likely to change the global incidence of conflict. 
In the short term, the evidence on the ground is that there has been a change for the 
better, but it would probably be unreasonably optimistic to conclude from this that the 
problem of conflict was no longer a priority. As we have seen, on the whole the analytic 
literature suggests that each of these three developments is liable to increase the 
incidence of conflict rather than reduce it, although their short term effects may be 
benign. CHR test whether recent favourable developments mark a significant sea-change 




1965-2004, and they introduce a dummy variable for the sub-period 2000-2004 into their 
analysis of risk. They find that it is insignificant: their results suggest that the 
improvements during the sub-period were explicable in terms of the variables included in 
the model, rather than reflecting some omitted political development. This suggests that 
without more effective international intervention, internal violent conflict is likely to 
continue to be a substantial problem for low-income societies in coming decades and thus 




There have been over 200 coup attempts just in Africa in the past 30 years. Coups 
continue to plague the region: for example, recent successful coups have occurred in 
Mauritania (2005) and the Central African Republic (2003), a failed coup led to the 
present civil war in Cote d’Ivoire, and in 2006 there was another failed coup against the 
democratic government of Madagascar. The phenomenon has recently become 
researchable by quantitative techniques thanks to a comprehensive dataset compiled by 
McGowan (2003). 
 
The costs of coups 
 
Although coups are nothing like as costly as civil wars, they do generate costs in various 
forms.  
 
One cost is the direct loss of income in the year of the coup due to the political 
disruption. Collier, Goderis and Hoeffler (2006) investigated these costs through a co-
integration analysis of growth using global data from the period 1970-2003. CGH found 
that a coup significantly and substantially reduced growth in the year following the coup, 
by around 3 percentage points. It was not feasible to instrument for coups in this analysis 
and there is some potential risk of endogeneity: an exogenous growth collapse might 
indeed increase the risk of a coup. However, this effect would need to be very powerful 
to account for such a large apparent growth loss and the interpretation we here place on 
the result seems to us to be reasonable. They did not find the effects to be highly 
persistent: if the dependent variable was changed to growth over a decade a coup during 
the decade had no significant effect. Since the average coup would occur in the middle of 
the decade, this gives some guide to the likely evolution of the economy. In the first year 
following the coup (i.e. year 6) the economy would lose 3% relative to counterfactual, 
but during years 7-10 it would fully recover this lost growth. Assuming the recovery to be 
linear and reached in year 10, on average over the four years following a coup GDP 
would be 1.5% below its counterfactual, implying a cumulative cost of around 6% of 
annual GDP.  
 
A different cost of a coup is its consequences for military spending. There are two 
components to this cost. One, investigated by Collier and Hoeffler (2007), is that a 
successful coup leads to a sharp increase in military spending. This is unsurprising: the 
coup leaders reward the army for its loyalty by expanding its budget. It is reasonable to 




regimes tend to spend considerably more on the military than civilian regimes, even 
controlling for the risks of war and other factors which account for military spending. 
Were a coup to result in the maximum shift in regime type, from a fully democratic 
government to a severe autocracy, military spending would be persistently higher by 
around 2 percentage points of GDP. Coups never result in such sharp swings although 
that in Burma may have come quite close depending on how the counterfactual evolution 
of the country is seen. Many coups simply replace one military dictator with another and 
so a more reasonable assessment of the persistent impact upon military spending is 
around 0.5 percentage points of GDP. If this loss persists for a decade, which is again 
within the reasonable range, then the cost after discounting would be around 4 percentage 
points of GDP. Note that this treats the excess military spending resulting from rule by 
the military as an indulgence. Since Collier and Hoeffler estimate the effect on military 
spending controlling for the risk of conflict this is probably reasonable, although we 
should recognize the possibility that a higher level of military spending than that chosen 
by a civilian government could conceivably not be a social waste. 
 
The other potential link between military spending and coups arises because where the 
risk of a coup is high governments try to reduce it by pre-emptively raising military 
spending. This is investigated in Collier and Hoeffler (2007a) who build a simultaneous 
model to disentangle the two-way causation between coups and military spending. They 
find that controlling for endogeneity, a high level of coup risk indeed significantly 
increases spending. However, the size of the effect is quite small and we omit it from our 
calculations.   
 
Potentially, the risk of a coup has a chilling effect on economic performance, an effect 
that would be consistent with the adverse effects of ‘political instability’ that are 
commonly found in the growth literature. However, CGH used the estimated coup risks 
generated by the above model to investigate the possibility and did not find coup risk to 
be significant in the growth process once the significant adverse effects of actual coups 
were included.  
 
Like civil wars, coups could potentially be politically beneficial. Evidently, coup leaders 
routinely justify their actions in such terms. Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) have recently 
investigated what determines whether an autocratic government performs well or badly 
and has highlighted the importance of the ability to remove a leader in response to 
disaffection among the ‘selectariat’. While it is indeed possible to find examples of coups 
which led to improved governance, this does not appear to be the general pattern. Collier 
and Hoeffler (2007a) find that a coup leads to a significantly higher risk of further coups. 
This is hardly surprising, since for the very process which attempts to legitimate a coup 
inadvertently legitimates a counter-coup. In unpublished work they also find that coups 
significantly increase the risk of civil war. This was, for example, the sequence in Cote 
d’Ivoire, until then ‘the jewel of Francophone Africa’. On the basis of these statistical 
results there is some basis for concluding that coups, like civil wars, generally erode the 
political system. However, for our purposes we merely need to assume that the costs 





In summary, a successful coup d’etat typically generates economic costs of the order of 
10% of one year’s GDP. In part this is due to losses in output, and in part due to the 
diversion of output to useless military spending. For the typical small, coup-prone 
developing country these costs amount to around $2bn per successful coup. In Africa 
over the period 1956-2003 there were 83 successful coups, implying a cost of the order of 
$166bn spread of the period, before discounting, or an annual average of around $4bn. 
Costs of this order of magnitude are not large, measured on the scale of global concerns. 
 
As with civil wars, before accepting this figure we should consider whether our 
quantification omits other important costs. The first omitted consideration in our 
quantification of civil wars was that the citizens of war-prone countries are the poorest 
and least hopeful on earth. As we will see, this consideration carries over to coups 
because, like civil wars, they are more likely the lower is income and the slower is 
growth. In general, the other considerations that apply to civil wars do not carry over to 
coups: their effects are not usually large and highly persistent, and they do not threaten 
the existence value of a society. They do, however, often have one further cost: almost by 
definition a coup ushers in a military government. Sometimes the government that is 
replaced was itself a military government, but sometimes a coup indeed replaces a 
democratic regime by the military. As argued by Azam (1994), democracy should surely 
be seen as having some value over-and-above its consequences for macroeconomic 
performance. Hence, such coups are intrinsically undesirable. Should the international 
community attach any negative value to regime change from democratic to military rule? 
Manifestly, part of the justification for the hugely expensive intervention in Iraq was to 
induce regime change in the opposite direction and there was also a huge international 
effort to support the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe. Hence, the international 
community certainly behaves in a manner consistent with an assignment of some positive 
value to democracy as opposed to military rule. We thus have two large omitted 
considerations, the atypically poor circumstances of coup-prone countries, and the non-
economic costs generated by the replacement of democracy by military rule. Again, one 
approach is to ignore these considerations and treat the figure of $2bn per coup as the 
lower bound. Alternatively, we can scale up this lower-bound by an adjustment factor. 
We previously suggested that the order of magnitude adjustment for the fact that citizens 
of countries prone to civil war were particularly poor was to double the lower bound and 
these arguments carry over to coups. What, if any, allowance should be made for the 
intrinsic value of democracy? Again, we propose that a reasonable adjustment is to 
double the estimate. This is because the economic costs of a coup are modest so that even 
doubling does not place a very high intrinsic value on democracy.  As an example of how 
the transition between democracy and military dictatorship is now valued consider 
Nigeria. When the military regime that had ruled Nigeria for fifteen years was replaced 
by President Obasanjo the event was treated within Nigeria as a national triumph and 
globally as a giant step forward for Africa. Allowing for these two adjustments would 
produce a cost of a typical successful coup at around $8bn, or an average cost to Africa 
over the period 1965-2003 of around $16bn. One way of ‘truth-testing’ this figure is to 
pose the direct question ‘what would it have been worth, both to Africa itself and to the 
international community, for Africa to have been free of coups? For us, the figure of 




that being coup-free would have been broadly commensurate with the entire international 
aid program to Africa which seems excessive, whereas a figure half of it would begin to 
marginalize the problem that Africa’s main form of political change has been military. As 
with civil wars, we thus have a reasonably hard lower bound figure, namely $4bn per 
year, and a highly approximate attempt at a figure more representative of the centre of the 
range, $16bn per year. As with civil wars the reader is left with the choice between them.  
 
Even if the cost of coups has been of the order of $16bn per year, the cost is not large 
relative to some other global problems. However, they have one potentially interesting 
feature for the international community. Those governments subject to coup risk naturally 
consider the threat of a coup to be of vital concern. In Africa, setting aside death in office 
from natural causes, coups have been by far the most frequent reason for changes of 
regime, dwarfing the number of changes due to either elections or rebellions. Hence, 
governments have a strong interest in cooperating with strategies that significantly reduce 
this risk. We will suggest that this may open up interesting possibilities for packaging 
international interventions.   
 
Causes of coups 
 
What makes a government particularly prone to a coup d’etat. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2007a) find that low per capita income significantly and substantially increases risks. At 
the mean of other variables, halving income increases the risk by 35%. This has the 
important implication that exposure to coups is concentrated among the poorest countries.  
Growth also affects coup risk, but although the effect is statistically significant it is small. 
As noted, coups beget further coups. This result is not merely picking up a fixed effect 
since the heightened coup risk fades with time.   
 
Since coups are political events it would seem likely that they are determined primarily 
by the political context. In particular, we might expect that autocratic regimes are more 
prone to coups than democratic regimes. Unfortunately, the data do not bear this out. 
Collier and Hoeffler search for a significant break point along the range of the Polity IV 
classification of political regimes, the range being from -10 (severe autocracy) to +10 
(impeccable democracy). They find that there is only one such break point, namely at -5, 
this demarcating highly repressive regimes as opposed to less repressive regimes. 
Unfortunately, far from the extreme autocracies facing a higher risk of coups, they face a 
markedly lower risk: repression works. The effect is large, repression halving the risk at 
the means of other variables. An implication of this is that governments cannot defend 





Again we briefly turn to prognosis. How important are coups likely to be in the future? 
The higher risk due to democracy suggests that coups may continue to occur. However, 
unlike civil wars, there is a favourable time trend: coups have gradually been going out of 




incidence suggests that there may be a moment when ‘eradication’ is possible, at least at 
the regional level.  
 
III. Four military-related instruments 
 
To summarize so far, over the past forty years civil wars have been on average costing a 
lower bound estimate of around $117bn per year, with a centre-of-the-range illustrative 
estimate of around $500bn per year; while the corresponding costs for coups have been 
around a further $4bn per year (lower bound) to $16bn (illustrative centre-of-range). 
These costs have fallen systematically upon the poorest and slowest growing countries in 
the world: the bottom billion. The costs considerably exceed the aid flows that these 
countries have received over this period: even the lower bounds are broadly 
commensurate with total aid flows, but a considerable proportion of this aid has accrued 
to countries that are at income levels above this bottom group. The prognosis for coups is 
encouraging: they are becoming less common, most probably because they are 
increasingly seen as illegitimate by the international community. However, we should 
note that this very process implies that the cost of those coups that still occur is greater 
since the lost democracy is valued more highly. The prognosis for civil wars is more 
confused: the short term evidence on the ground is encouraging, but three important 
longer term influences are all adverse.  
 
The case for concern about political violence is threefold. Partly, as the above numbers 
show, the economic costs are substantial. Second, as our discussion in the Introduction 
emphasized, the lower bound numbers are probably far below the true costs. In particular, 
the costs are concentrated upon the poorest people on earth, and without secure peace it is 
difficult to help them in other ways. Further, global peace is increasingly seen by many 
people as having an intrinsic value over-and-above its measurable economic benefits. 
While it is important that such vague sentiments are not allowed to override well-founded 
quantification, it may suggest that large scale violence has some negative ‘existence 
value’ that while not infinite is substantial. This was, indeed, to an extent the sentiment of 
the previous Copenhagen Consensus panel: they described the eradication of violent 
conflict as being of fundamental value, if only instruments could be found that were 
demonstrably effective.  
 
We now turn from the objectives to the instruments. In the paper on conflict by Collier 
and Hoeffler for the first Copenhagen Consensus, the main instruments considered were 
development aid and the promulgation of international standards for the governance of 
natural resource revenues. The panel was generally sceptical of the efficacy of aid. The 
promulgation of governance standards incurred very little cost and its benefits were at 
that time highly speculative, so that the strategy did not lend itself to the calculation of a 
cost-benefit ratio.  
 
In the present paper, we have narrowed the focus to two types of violent conflict that we 
see as preventable, namely the recurrence of civil war in post-conflict situations, and the 
prevention of coups in countries that are at least partially democratic. We have also 




Our focus on military strategies is partly because in one sense these are the most ‘natural’ 
strategies with which to counter large-scale political violence. If civil wars and coups are 
to be discouraged, quite possibly, force needs to be opposed by force. The other reason 
for our focus on military strategies is, as we have discussed, that the war in Iraq and the 
immense attention that it has attracted have come to dominate thinking on military 
intervention. Yet the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent military engagement have both 
been highly peculiar. Although Iraq is often described as a post-conflict situation, it is not 
analogous to the post-conflict period following a civil war in a low-income country 
which is both the core phenomenon addressed in this paper and the most common 
conflict risk, globally. The 2003 war in Iraq was manifestly not a civil war but an 
international war. The situation since April 2004 has had combat-related mortality rates 
arising out of organized internal violence against an incumbent government that are well 
above the threshold for classification as a civil war, albeit one that is partially 
internationalized. Hence, citizen opinion as to the likely efficacy of international military 
intervention has been powerfully shaped by an experience that is irrelevant to the core 
security problem of small, low-income societies. Whether or not such intervention is 
sometimes a useful, cost-effective instrument, is a matter for analysis. This paper 
attempts such analysis. We are not concerned to advocate military intervention. However, 
the need for a dispassionate analysis of its potential efficacy seems to us to be much 
stronger now than at the planning stage of the first Copenhagen Consensus.    
 
We are going to investigate three international strategies that focus on military provision. 
One is the attempt to change the size of the domestic military establishment chosen by a 
government. We will focus particularly on post-conflict governments. The second 
strategy is to provide military services internationally, generally but not exclusively as 
peacekeepers under the auspices of the United Nations. The third strategy is to offer 
guarantees of external military provision should circumstances require it.  
 
International Curtailment of Domestic Military Spending 
 
The level of military spending chosen by the government of a country facing a risk of a 
civil war or a coup d’etat is sometimes either higher or lower than international actors 
would prefer. For example, in Uganda during the 1990s the major aid agencies tried to 
induce the government to reduce its military spending. Conversely, foreign governments 
sometimes provide either arms or finance to bolster of government’s capacity to fight an 
insurrection, an example being USA military support to the government of Colombia. 
These attempts at changing the level of spending chosen by a government raise two 
important questions: is such a change desirable, and if so, is external influence effective? 
Here we consider the first of these questions. The efficacy of intervention is deferred 
until Part IV. 
 
Evidently, the case for curtailment or support must be made on a case-by-case basis, but 
does research give any guide as to the likely effect of military spending by a government 
on the risk of internal conflict? Since our interest is specifically in post-conflict 
situations, this is the context on which we focus. Military spending in low-income 




(Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2007). They find that the level of 
military spending chosen by a government is systematically explicable in terms of the 
threats that it faces, the domestic pressure groups, and the ability of the government to 
finance public spending. Collier and Hoeffler are able to show that governments indeed 
significantly and substantially increase their military spending in response to the risk of 
civil war, objectively measured. This is consistent with the pattern we discussed above 
when estimating the cost of a civil war: post-conflict governments usually fail to reduce 
their military spending back to peacetime levels. Thus, the high level of post-conflict 
military spending is at least in part a response to the recognition that post-conflict risk of 
conflict reversion is high. 
 
In effect, post-conflict governments are operating on the hypothesis that high military 
spending in this situation is risk-reducing. While this is a priori plausible, it is no more 
than a hypothesis. Collier and Hoeffler set out a counter-hypothesis, rooted in a game-
theoretic analysis of why in post-conflict situations military spending might have an 
unintended adverse effect. Their key point is to consider the decision as to whether to 
revert to violence from the perspective of those outside the post-conflict government. 
Typically, as part of the peace settlement, this group will have been given various 
undertakings as to post-conflict policies: in effect, they will have been promised some 
share in government revenues. Sometimes this will be highly explicit, as in the settlement 
of the conflict in southern Sudan, at other times it will be largely implicit. In either case, 
there is a potential time consistency problem. As the peace persists, the capacity of the 
rebel party to maintain its military forces gradually declines. The rebels may then 
reasonably fear that there will come a point at which the government revokes its 
commitments and uses its now-superior military force to crush its opponents. Fearing 
this, the rebels may decide to pre-empt this risk by returning to conflict. A recent 
example of such a sequence is the post-election shoot-out between the forces of the 
opposition and the government in the DRC in November 2006. In this instance the rebels 
left the return to violence too late for success and their leader had to go into exile. Thus, 
the key rebel decision problem is to determine the intentions of the government: will it 
renege on its commitments? The rebels thus face a ‘screening’ problem of trying to 
distinguish genuine commitment from lies. In turn, if the government is indeed genuinely 
committed to maintaining its promises, it faces a problem of how to establish this fact, 
given that anything it says could also be said by a government that was trying to dupe the 
rebels, and that the environment is one of intense hatreds and suspicions. In other words, 
the genuinely-committed government faces a ‘signalling problem’: what action can it 
take that would reveal its type? As in the standard theory of signalling, such a 
government needs to find an action that, were it not genuinely committed, it would 
simply refuse to do. Only such an action cannot be imitated and so it reveals the 
government’s true type. A substantial reduction in government military spending may 
well be such a signal. It has two advantages. One is that it directly bears upon rebel fears 
of rule by oppression. The other is that it is difficult to reverse: once the military is scaled 
down it would take time to rebuild it. Hence, a deep cut in military spending might well 
signal that the government is committed to maintain an inclusive style of government and 





In principle either of these hypotheses could be correct. They are tested in Collier and 
Hoeffler (2006). The evident problem with such an investigation is that because military 
spending is endogenous to risk, an apparent relationship from military spending to risk is 
likely to be spurious. High levels of spending may appear to cause high levels of risk 
when in fact causality is the other way round. In order to control for endogeneity and 
establish a clear causal relationship it is therefore necessary to instrument for military 
spending. Fortunately, because military spending is systematically predictable by a range 
of variables, it is possible to find valid instruments that strongly influence chosen levels 
of spending but do not influence the risk of civil war. Once military spending is 
instrumented, Collier and Hoeffler find that its effect on the risk of conflict is distinctive 
in post-conflict situations. Their key result is that in post-conflict situations, but only 
those situations, government military spending is significantly and substantially counter-
productive. This is consistent with the prediction of the screening-signalling theory: it is 
only in the post-conflict situation that the opposition has an established military capacity 
which is in decline, and some explicit or implicit understanding with the government that 
helped to conclude the civil war. 
 
If it is correct this is evidently an important result. An implication would be that post-
conflict governments are operating on precisely the wrong theory of risk reduction and 
inadvertently aggravating rather than reducing it. In turn, it would suggest that 
international actors would in general be right to discourage spending to the extent that 
they have the scope to do so and so open the question of the efficacy of such 
interventions.  
 
To investigate the robustness of the CH2006 results we undertook an entirely fresh 
analysis, using both an improved methodology and expanded data. Whereas CH2006 
relied upon a logit analysis of risk during five-year periods, the subsequent paper on post-
conflict risks by Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (CHS), (forthcoming), had switched to 
the more continuous approach of hazard functions. As discussed further below, in our re-
analysis of the CHS model for the present study we therefore included domestic military 
spending, instrumented as in CH2006 as an explanatory variable. This was potentially 
quite a severe test both due to the change in approach and the expansion of the data set. 
In fact, domestic military spending, as instrumented, continued to be both statistically 
significant and adverse, substantially increasing the risk of further conflict.  
 
We now use these results to quantify the costs of high post-conflict military spending by 
the government. The costs are normally measured simply at face value: that is, if the 
government spends $100m extra on the military, this is typically seen by external actors 
as a waste that has an opportunity cost of $100m. Our point here is to demonstrate that if 
both the present results and the CH2006 results are approximately right, then this is a 
gross under-estimate of their true costs. For the typical post-conflict country an additional 
$100m of military spending would increase the military budget by 0.5 percentage points 
of GDP. This in turn would increase the risk of conflict reversion by 2.56 percentage 
points. Applying our previous estimates of the costs of a civil war to the post-conflict 
country and to its neighbours, this additional risk incurs lower-bound costs of $1.5bn, and 




generates additional costs of the order of $6.3bn: the concealed and inadvertent costs are 
of the order of sixty times the apparent costs.  
 
Thus, in post-conflict situations, domestic military spending has very high and largely 
inadvertent costs. This creates some basis for international actors to attempt to curtail it to 
the extent that they have instruments that are efficacious. We will investigate this in Part 
IV.  
 
While the ‘true’ costs may seem very high, we have actually chosen not to include a 
further layer of costs which come from neighbourhood ‘arms races’. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2007) establish that typically one influence upon military spending is the amount spent 
by neighbours, although the motive for emulation need not be that of a perceived threat. 
For example, it could simply be that the military in each country uses the spending 
increases of neighbours as an effective means of lobbying its ministry of finance. The 
resulting interdependence of military spending generates an arms race multiplier. In 
effect, the excessive military spending of post-conflict countries induces increases in the 
military spending of their neighbours which diverts public spending from productive 
uses. As long these neighbours are not themselves post-conflict, there is no adverse effect 
on the risk of conflict: the aggravation of risk is confined to post-conflict situations. 
Nevertheless, in effect excess military spending by one country is a neighbourhood 
public bad in that it induces this expenditure diversion. 
 
Expanding the role of peacekeeping forces   
 
International peacekeeping in post-conflict situations is now a major activity with a high 
political profile both in developed and developing countries. This is precisely the type of 
policy for which a quantitative analysis can add value to decisions because, in its 
absence, decisions a liable to be highly politicized. In particular, following the experience 
of post-conflict peacekeeping in Iraq, in developed countries there is little appetite for 
sending troops into post-conflict situations, and little belief in their likely success. 
Conversely, in part of Africa the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the 
UN is increasingly seen as the ‘new IMF’, that is, a challenge to untrammelled domestic 
sovereignty. Yet Iraq may be a very misleading basis for understanding post-conflict 
peacekeeping. Recall, Iraq was not a peacekeeping operation following a civil war, but 
rather an international war which, after a brief interval, has triggered an ongoing civil 
war. Similarly, the notion of untrammelled national sovereignty in the face of high risks 
of further conflict may need to be challenged in view of the high costs that conflicts 
inflict upon neighbourhoods.  
 
Peacekeeping interventions have become very much more common since the end of the 
Cold War. Currently there are 100,000 uniformed personnel serving in UN peacekeeping 
operations in 16 countries.  
 





The supply of effective peacekeeping troops is limited. A simple way of economizing on 
them is to base them in their home countries but to provide ‘over the horizon’ guarantees 
of rapid intervention should this be necessary. The initial British military intervention in 
Sierra Leone has evolved over the last seven years into a variant which is potentially a 
particularly interesting security technology, namely an ‘over-the-horizon’ guarantee. The 
British government has withdrawn all but a token military force in Sierra Leone, but has 
made a ten-year commitment to fly troops back into the country should there be any 
security need. Sierra Leone has continued to be peaceful under this guarantee, but 
evidently, in any particular instance it is not possible to establish the likely 
counterfactual: possibly peace would have been maintained even without any 
commitment. 
 
The British over-the-horizon guarantee reinvents and refines a much older strategy of the 
French government which until the late-1990s provided a less explicit security safeguard 
for the whole of Francophone Africa. For over thirty years, from the early 1960s until the 
late 1990s, the French government provided security cover to Francophone governments 
in Africa which, while less than a guarantee, was nevertheless credible because it was 
backed by a chain of French military bases around the region. The ending of the French 
policy can be clearly dated. It began with the onset of the genocide in Rwanda. French 
troops had been stationed in the country to protect the government, and this presence 
came dangerously close to propping up the regime as it began the genocide, only just 
being terminated in time to avoid accusations of complicity. Following this, French 
government policy was rethought, its first important manifestation being the reaction to 
the coup de’etat in Cote d’Ivoire in December 1999. The ‘old guard’ within the French 
government advised the president to use French military forces to put down the coup as 
would previously have been standard. However, the president decided that this would be 
inconsistent with France’s new policy and so decided not to authorize intervention. This 
then marks the clear end to the French informal security quasi-guarantee.  
 
The subsequent history of Cote d’Ivoire suggests that the French withdrawal of a security 
guarantee was very costly. The country descended into prolonged civil war which 
necessitated French military intervention to police a security zone between the warring 
sides. Paradoxically, the British government reinvention of the policy of a security 
guarantee occurred shortly after the French had abandoned it.  
 
A priori, an international security guarantee may be either more or less effective than 
actually maintaining peacekeeping troops on the ground, country-by-country. An over-
the-horizon guarantee has two major cost advantages over country-by-country 
peacekeeping. First, for most of the time most of the troops can be kept in their home 
country which is far cheaper than maintaining them in-country. For example, the British 
have only 80 troops actually in Sierra Leone but could fly in a large force overnight and 
did so during the onset of Operation Palliser. Second, the same force can guarantee 
security in several different countries. Since these risks are unlikely to be called 
simultaneously, a pooled central force can provide a far larger potential presence when it 
is actually needed. This is, incidentally, consistent with the result discussed previously 




countries is reduced: there are security economies of scale. CHS find that it is the 
absolute scale of the force that matters, as opposed to troops per head of population, and 
so pooling can actually be more effective in deterring the recurrence of conflict than 
individual country-by-country forces that cannot be rapidly reinforced because neither 
thet politics nor the logistics have been sorted out in advance. Thus, potentially, an over-
the-horizon guarantee might be a considerably superior technology to conventional 
peacekeeping. 
 
IV: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Interventions to Reduce the Risk of Civil Wars and 
Coups 
 
We now consider how military interventions and aid might be deployed in post-conflict 
situations so as to reduce risk, and how the costs of these interventions compare with the 
benefits. The analysis is complicated because several distinct interactions must be 
considered. We begin with aid provided in post-conflict situations. We choose this 
intervention for three reasons. First, compared to other forms of aid it is far more 
effective in reducing the risk of violent conflict. This qualification is important: aid to 
post-conflict societies may or may not be more effective in poverty reduction than aid to 
other low-income societies. In general, it is likely to be the case that aid for the express 
purposes of poverty reduction is best highly-targeted within a society. Similarly, aid to 
reduce mortality may best be targeted on activities such as the vaccination of infants. If, 
however, the objective is to reduce the risk of violent conflict, then post-conflict societies 
are the most appropriate focus because of their abnormally high risk of conflict. Recall 
that the typical post-conflict society has a risk of conflict reversion during the first decade 
of 40%. Other societies generally have risks far less than this. Nor is it possible to make 
actionable forecasts of differences in risks between such societies: the forecasts 
themselves would be highly uncertain and in any case could not be publicized to aid 
agencies. Further, as we will see, aid is more effective in the growth process post-conflict 
than in other situations. Thus, the case for as an instrument for security is at its most 
powerful in the post-conflict context. Our second reason for focusing on post-conflict aid 
is that it is the least controversial type of security intervention. In contrast, military 
intervention in any form is now highly controversial. Because of this, aid for post-conflict 
situations constitutes a useful benchmark. If it is more cost-effective than military 
interventions then it dominates them both in economic terms and politically. If it is less 
cost-effective then potentially there is a trade-off between effectiveness and political 
acceptability. Our third reason is that, as we will argue, aid can complement other 
interventions, forming a more effective package.  
 
The Benchmark Intervention: The Instrument of Post-Conflict Aid 
 
Post-conflict aid is the main non-military instrument of maintaining peace available to the 
international community. It was indeed the initial rationale for aid, being the founding 
purpose for the World Bank, which was initially going to be called the International Bank 
for Reconstruction. The potential importance of post-conflict aid is increased by the 
evidence that political interventions such as democratic elections does not appear to be 





Whether aid is effective in reducing the risk of conflict reversion depends upon three 
steps. First, aid should be effective in the post-conflict growth process. Second, growth 
should be effective in bringing down post-conflict risks. Third, there should be no 
offsetting effect of aid that directly increases the risk of conflict.  
 
We previously considered the instrument of post-conflict aid in the first Copenhagen 
Consensus. We now summarize the results of that work and discuss how those results 
need to be qualified in the light of more recent work. 
 
Aid and growth post-conflict 
 
The effect of aid on growth has become considerably more contested since the original 
Collier and Hoeffler paper. In general there is increased skepticism as to the efficacy of 
aid although there have also been some high-quality research papers that have found 
evidence that aid-for-growth is effective. A useful ‘meta-study’ by Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2006) reviews some seventy underlying studies of the effect of aid and from this 
the modal study finds small but positive effects. However, few studies focus specifically 
on aid in the context of post-conflict. There are good reasons to expect that aid might be 
less problematic in such situations. Unlike the normal aid relationship, there is no serious 
‘moral hazard’ problem. That is, no society is likely to be tempted into civil war by the 
prospect of post-conflict aid: the costs are simply too high relative to the likely returns. 
Further, the devastation of infrastructure during war opens obvious opportunities for 
high-return aid investments. For example, in Uganda the restoration of rural roads by 
World Bank projects shortly after the end of the civil war in the late 1980s is estimated to 
have had an annual rate of return of 40%. 
 
At the time of the first Copenhagen Consensus the only quantitative study of aid in the 
post-conflict growth process was that of Collier and Hoeffler, (2004b). The detailed 
results of that paper were summarized in Appendix 3 of their Copenhagen Consensus 
chapter and will not be repeated. They found that during the first post-conflict decade 
growth is typically faster than normal. That is, there is some economic recovery. Indeed, 
this result has been fundamental to subsequent estimates of the cost of civil war because 
the recovery limits the post-conflict costs: eventually the economy reverts to the level of 
economic activity without the conflict. While the result that there is a growth recovery 
massively reduces the estimated cost of a civil war, it is also the foundation for the 
evidence that post-conflict aid is effective. Collier and Hoeffler find that the pace of post-
conflict growth is determined partly by the quality of economic policies and governance, 
and partly by the volume of aid. In particular, they find that compared with aid in 
societies that are not post-conflict, aid is considerably more effective in raising growth.  
 
Although this paper was reputably published, in view of the considerable skepticism 
relating to aid and the small sample available for that study it is important to consider 
whether there is further statistical evidence. Three studies specifically focused on aid and 
economic performance in post-conflict situations have subsequently been published. 




use a much larger sample of post-conflict countries. Their focus on the real exchange rate 
reflects recent concerns that aid might inadvertently kill the growth process through 
generating Dutch disease: destroying the competitiveness of exports. An influential new 
paper by Rajan and Subramanian (2005) provides some evidence for these concerns. 
Incorporating these real exchange rate effects, Elbadawi et al. indeed find that there is an 
adverse effect of aid via real appreciation. However, crucially for present purposes, they 
also find that this effect is much weaker in post-conflict situations so that aid is 
substantially and significantly more effective than normal. In part this may be because 
exporting is in any case likely to be limited in post-conflict economies. Typically the 
recovery of exports is confined to mineral extraction which is not very sensitive to 
concerns about the real exchange rate. Adam, Collier and Davies (forthcoming) focus on 
the consequences of conflict for inflationary financing. Unsurprisingly, they find that 
during civil wars governments resort to money printing and heavy implicit taxation of the 
financial system. During civil war the typical government has its back to the wall and is 
desperate for revenue, even from sources that are so damaging in the long term that 
normally it would not adopt them. Further, these sources of finance may be the only 
options because, far more than in the case of international war, external sources of 
borrowing dry up. There is abundant evidence that inflation and severe financial 
repression are indeed both damaging to long term growth. In effect, during conflict 
economic policy is in crisis mode. During the post-conflict period governments are faced 
with hard choices. There are large demands on spending, while tax revenues have been 
reduced both by economic decline and the retreat of activity into subsistence. They show 
that in the absence of aid governments resolve this dilemma by persisting with 
inflationary financing, thereby delaying the recovery of confidence in the currency and 
the restoration of the financial system. They find that aid is used by governments in post-
conflict situations distinctively: it resolves this dilemma and is used by governments to 
abandon the deficit financing strategy. Finally, Davies (forthcoming) investigates capital 
flight during and after civil war. Capital flight is a major macroeconomic phenomenon in 
the countries most prone to conflict. McIndoe (2007) updates the published estimates of 
capital flight by Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo (2001) and estimates that as of 2004 around 
36% of Africa’s private wealth was outside the region. Consistent with other studies, 
Davies finds that capital flight increases both during civil war and during the post-
conflict period. His important contribution is to analyze what determines capital flight 
during the post-conflict period, and in particular to what extent this is distinctive. He 
finds that in the post-conflict period capital flight is significantly and substantially more 
sensitive to inflation than in other superficially similar but peaceful situations. Possibly 
the explanation for this heightened sensitivity is that asset holders are aware of the risks 
of conflict reversion and are looking for signals from their government of whether it is 
continuing to function in crisis mode or is taking a longer term view. The government’s 
choice of the inflation rate is thus a powerful, if inadvertent, signal of whether it is taking 
a long term view. This result is important for present purposes because it evidently relates 
closely to that of Adam et al. on the distinctively anti-inflationary effects of aid in post-
conflict situations. In currently unpublished work, Adam, Collier and Davies combine 
these results and show that in the post-conflict context aid is substantially reinforced by 
the induced reduction in capital flight. This is a further macroeconomic reason why aid 





Hence, in the post-conflict context aid has an important, distinctive and positive 
macroeconomic role which is not offset by the usual concerns about appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. While the evidence that aid raises growth in developing countries is 
generally somewhat weaker now than at the time of the first Copenhagen Consensus, the 
evidence that in the post-conflict context it raises growth has become stronger. Not only 
are there supporting econometric results, but the distinctive macroeconomic channels by 
which they might be explained are now much better understood. The coefficient on post-
conflict aid estimated in Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) implies that the gain in the growth 
rate from additional aid worth one percentage point of GDP sustained over the decade 
would be around 0.5 percentage points, and in the light of subsequent evidence this still 
seems a reasonable figure.  
 
Growth and risk post-conflict 
 
We now turn to the second step that must hold before aid can be regarded as even 
potentially cost-effective as an instrument for reducing post-conflict risks. This is that 
growth must be shown to reduce risks.  
 
At the time of the first Copenhagen Consensus the main evidence for this was the paper 
on the causes of conflict by Collier and Hoeffler (2004a). This had found general 
evidence that growth reduced risks, but the endogeneity problem inherent in the 
relationship was only addressed by means of a five-year lag. Since then an important 
study specifically on growth and the risk of civil war has been published as the lead 
article in the Journal of Political Economy (Miguel et al., 2004). This uses the ingenious 
and robust instrument of rainfall shocks for growth, an approach which requires them to 
confine their analysis to Africa. They show that so instrumented, growth significantly and 
powerfully reduces risk. The robustness of the general growth-risk relationship is further 
confirmed in the study by Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (forthcoming) which, as 
discussed, is a major update of the Collier and Hoeffler (2004a) analysis, doubling the 
data set so as to be comprehensive and applying many robustness checks.  
 
The general relationship that faster growth reduces the risk of civil war is thus far more 
well-founded than at the time of the former study. The next issue is whether there is any 
evidence relating specifically to the post-conflict context. After all, much of our argument 
rests on the distinctive features of this period and so it is entirely possible that the growth-
risk relationship is different. For example, a pessimistic view would be that the post-
conflict situation is typically so fragile that even though growth has the potential to 
benefit everyone, it might so disturb delicately balanced relationships that it opens up 
arenas for violent dispute.  
 
At the time of the former Copenhagen Consensus paper there was only one study 
specifically on risks during the post-conflict decade, namely that of Bigombe et al. 
(2000). This simply introduced a post-conflict dummy variable into the Collier-Hoeffer 
(2004a) model, using the same data as their original paper. It found that growth was 




post-conflict decade than in normal situations. Clearly, this evidence was limited in that 
its derivation was so closely related to the more general Collier-Hoeffler result on the 
effect of growth on risk: to the extent that the general result could be doubted, so could 
this refinement.   
 
Since the former Copenhagen Consensus paper there has been a substantial advance in 
the analysis of post-conflict risk as a result of the model in Collier, Hoeffler and 
Soderbom (forthcoming). As discussed further below, this paper takes a completely fresh 
approach to the data, analyzing 68 post-conflict situations, and uses a methodology much 
better suited to the question of how post-conflict risk evolves, namely the estimation of 
hazard functions as opposed to five-year logits. That study found that growth both 
significantly and substantially reduced the risk of reversion to conflict. As discussed, in 
work for the present study, we have revised and re-estimated the CHS study, 
incorporating domestic military spending as an explanatory variable. The addition of this 
variable does not affect the significance of the growth variable but somewhat increases 
the size of the coefficient. 
 
In addition to its direct contribution to risk reduction, faster growth cumulates to a higher 
level of income. Potentially, the level of income affects risk over-and-above its effect on 
the growth rate. Again, at the time of the former Copenhagen Consensus paper the main 
statistical evidence for a direct effect of the level of income came from the Collier-
Hoeffer model. Since the evident endogeneity of income to conflict was only addressed 
by means of a lag, there were reasonable lingering concerns that the result was not robust. 
The proposition that low income causes an increased risk of conflict is now more widely 
accepted in the literature. It is also supported by the analysis in Collier, Hoeffler and 
Rohner (forthcoming) which addressed the potential endogeneity of income by 
instrumenting it using some standard geographic variables. They found that this increased 
the magnitude of the effect compared to using the lagged income variable. There is also 
now evidence for the effect of the level of income specifically in post-conflict situations. 
CHS include the level of income, lagged by two periods, in their analysis of post-conflict 
risks in addition to the lagged growth rate, and find it to be significant.   
 
Hence, since the previous study for the Copenhagen Consensus, the evidence that growth 
reduces risk in post-conflict situations, both directly and indirectly via the level of 
income, has become considerably stronger. General endogeneity problems have been 
decisively addressed and the evidence specifically pertaining to the post-conflict situation 
is far more reliable.  
 
CHS provide a useful simulation that gives a sense of the magnitude of the overall effect 
of growth on risk. They take a post-conflict country otherwise at the mean of 
characteristics for post-conflict societies and vary the growth rate, cumulating the effects 
on the level of income. If the society is stagnant the risk of conflict reversion during the 
decade is 42.1%. If it sustains 10% growth through the decade, which some post-conflict 
societies such as Mozambique indeed manage to achieve, the risk falls to 26.9%. The 
reduction in risk comes roughly equally from the direct growth effect and the cumulating 




growth brings down the decade risk of reversion to conflict by around 1.5 percentage 
points. 
 
Finally, we need to consider the possibility that while aid might raise growth, and growth 
might reduce risk, aid might inadvertently directly increase the risk of conflict thereby 
nullifying its favorable indirect effect via the growth process. At the time of the first 
Copenhagen Consensus there was some speculation that aid might have such adverse 
effects, there being a discussion around the concept that aid should aim to ‘do no harm’. 
However, the only quantitative evidence was from Collier and Hoeffler (2002) which had 
introduced aid directly into their model of conflict risk. They found that aid controlling 
for growth, aid had no significant effect on the risk of conflict. However, this study 
predated the advance made by Tavares (2003) so that aid was not instrumented. Since aid 
could be presumed to be allocated with some view of conflict risk, the results were 
potentially spurious. Since the innovation of Tavares and the first Copenhagen 
Consensus, in unpublished work Collier and Hoeffler have revisited this question, 
instrumenting aid, and find the same result: aid does not have a significant effect on the 
risk of conflict. This result is not specific to post-conflict, but it is evidently a step 
towards reassurance that a post-conflict aid program would not inadvertently generate 
effects which undermined the intended benefits via growth.  
 
Costs and Benefits 
 
So far we have shown that there is now quite strong evidence that post-conflict aid is 
effective in bringing down the risks of conflict recurrence. This does not imply that the 
intervention is cost-effective, but it is a necessary condition for cost-effectiveness. In 
most cases other possible global interventions are known to be effective, and so the only 
issue is whether their known benefits justify their costs. In effect, our analysis so far has 
simply brought post-conflict aid up to this starting line.   
 
We have now assembled the building blocks needed to calculate the costs and benefits of 
aid to post-conflict societies. First, consider the costs. To achieve the above risk reduction 
in the risk of conflict recurrence of 1.5 percentage points over the post-conflict decade 
would require an additional one percentage point of growth sustained over the decade. 
This in turn could be achieved by aid worth 2 percentage points of GDP sustained for a 
decade. For the typical post-conflict society this would cost around $400m per year, or 
$4bn before discounting.  
 
Now consider the benefits. Recall that our lower-bound estimate of the cost of conflict 
reversion is around $60bn. At this lower bound the gross gain purely in terms of the 
reduction in the risk of recurrence of civil war of 1.5 percentage points is of the order of 
$900m. Note that although the figure of $60bn is discounted so as to be a present value in 
the year that the conflict might start, the reduced risk is spread over the entire decade, in 
effect being a flow of gains of around $90m accruing annually through the decade. 
Hence, for this to be shown as present value at the beginning of the post-conflict decade 
this flow would itself need to be discounted. It is thus commensurate with the 




not cost-effective when the only gains that are counted are the security gains. When the 
the lower bound estimate is replaced by the centre-of-the-range illustration of $250bn, the 
gain rises to $4.25bn and so modestly exceeds its costs. This, of course, depends upon 
estimates of benefits which are speculative. However, we should note that when we have 
presented the figures on the degree of effectiveness of aid in bringing down risks to the 
international donor community they are seen as constituting a powerful case for post-
conflict aid. In effect, with these responses international donors are revealing a value on 
peace rather in excess of our illustration of $250bn and there is no particular basis for 
seeing such a high valuation as misplaced.   
 
There is, of course, a further reason to value post-conflict aid, namely that it also 
generates additional income during the decade and so alleviates poverty. The additional 
one percentage point of growth augments GDP during the decade by $10bn before 
discounting and before valuing the benefits beyond that decade. Hence, again using the 
centre-of-the-range illustration, the gross gains are around $13.8bn from costs of $4bn, 
implying a ratio of benefits to costs of around 3.5:1. 
 
Post-conflict aid thus looks to be a good use for development aid, but not so spectacular 
that it would trump most other calls on scarce international public resources. To an extent 
donors are already taking this opportunity. However, although aid is provided in post-
conflict settings it is not usually sustained. Over the entire course of the first post-conflict 
decade aid is no higher than were the society not post-conflict, while during the first 
couple of years of peace there is a flood of aid. Hence, aid typically tapers out just as it 
should be tapering in.  
 
Military Intervention Opportunity 1: a conditionality requirement limiting military 
spending 
 
One concern about aid is that is may inadvertently finance military spending. Donors do 
not permit their development assistance to be used for this purpose, but there are various 
ways in which aid might nevertheless have this effect. One is as a result of the well-
understood concept of fungibility: aid given ostensibly for one purpose releases 
government money that would otherwise have been used for this purpose and the money 
so released can be spent on anything. Another mechanism is that aid is foreign exchange 
and so augments the capacity of the economy to import. Typically governments levy 
substantial taxes on imports and so, indirectly, aid is taxed, the resulting revenue being 
available for the government to use for any purpose.  
 
Typically, the governments of developing countries choose to spend about 10-20% of 
their revenues on the military. It would not, therefore, be surprising if through one or 
other of these routes aid augmented military spending by some such proportion. Collier 
and Hoeffler (2007) investigated this empirically, by including aid as an explanatory 
variable in their analysis of the determinants of military spending. To allow for evident 
problems of endogeneity they instrumented aid, following the approach pioneered by 
Tavares (2003). This approach utilises the fact that a considerable proportion of aid 




within the aid-providing country, and partly by historic ties to particular recipient 
countries, both of which are independent of the current circumstances of recipients. With 
aid so instrumented, Collier and Hoeffler indeed find that it significantly increases 
military spending, the proportion of aid that leaks into military spending being around 
11%. Collier and Hoeffler do not analyze whether aid in post-conflict situations leaks by 
a larger or smaller factor than in other contexts. In what follows we will assume that the 
rate of leakage is average, namely 11%. This is probably a conservative assumption since 
we know that in post-conflict situations governments place a much higher priority on 
military spending than in normal peacetime situations, manifested by military spending 
being significantly higher.  
 
This raises two issues, one being the true costs of these leakages viewed from the 
perspective of the donor, and the other being whether any actions on the part of the donor 
could potentially reduce leakage. 
 
One cost of the leakage is evidently the opportunity cost in terms of the intended uses of 
aid. If 11% of aid leaks into an activity which is unproductive the all the beneficial 
effects of aid are attributable to the remaining 89%. Were it possible to prevent leakage, 
the amount of aid available for beneficial uses would thus be augmented by around 12% 
(11/89). Hence, just through this route, an effective conditionality clause combined with 
post-conflict aid would raise the benefits of post-conflict aid in the benchmark example 
from $13.8bn to $15.5, implying a ratio of costs to benefits of 1:4. 
 
However, the main cost of the leakage is that in augmenting military spending it is 
inadvertently generating adverse effects, since as discussed, extra military spending in the 
post-conflict context is significantly counter-productive. Recall that the adverse effects of 
military spending in post-conflict situations are between 15 and 60 times its direct cost 
depending upon whether lower-bound or centre-of-range estimates are taken.  
 
Take a typical post-conflict situation in which GDP is around $20bn. Then the aid 
package of two percentage points of GDP considered above would amount to $400m per 
year. Thus, an 11% leakage of aid into military spending would augment the military 
budget by around $44m. This leakage would generate inadvertent costs in terms of a 
heightened risk of conflict of between $660m and $2.6bn. We should stress that this is 
not the net effect of post-conflict aid, since this adverse effect is already implicitly 
included in the net benefits estimated above. Nevertheless, it is a major negative effect. 
The contribution of aid to peace by means of faster growth is inadvertently partially 
offset by its tendency to undermine peace by augmenting the domestic military budget 
which, uniquely in post-conflict situations, aggravates the situation. 
 
Supposing that the leakage could be prevented by effective conditionality, what would 
the benefits be? Obviously, the benefits of conditionality have to be assessed in 
combination with the aid itself: the conditionality simply augments the effectiveness of 
the aid. However, taking the centre-of-the-range estimate, the benefits of the aid would 
increase from $15.5bn to around $18.1bn, thus raising the benefit-to-cost ratio to around 





This raises the evident question as to whether anything can be done to curtail the leakage 
of aid into military spending. There are various possible approaches, which may be 
reinforcing. 
 
One is to improve the information available to post-conflict governments on the typical 
effects of high domestic military spending. Governments may be deluding themselves in 
believing that it resolves their security problem, or more realistically, ministers of finance 
who wish to constrain military spending lack persuasive evidence to counter pressures 
from the large and powerful military lobby that is inevitably resistant to reductions in its 
budget. 
 
A second approach is for the donors to tighten conditions on the provision of aid. Any 
conditions must recognize the limits resulting from both the fungibility of project funding 
and the freedom attached to the alternative aid channel of budget support. It is infeasible 
to establish how their money is being spent. However, if the concern is that money 
should not go into military spending, then the donor has the analytically more feasible 
task of monitoring this part of the budget. In effect, the military spending of the post-
conflict government would need to be subject to an explicit cap as a condition for the 
receipt of post-conflict aid. This in turn is liable to encounter two obstacles, one political 
and the other technical. The political obstacle is the argument that such a condition would 
breach the sovereignty of the post-conflict government. This argument can be countered 
by the reasonable position that the sovereignty of the government does not extend to the 
right to spend donor money on purposes that flout donor conditions agreed to by the 
government. The donor cap would be designed to prevent aid being diverted rather than 
to induce the government to spend less of its own money on the military. Indeed, if the 
government did not want to constrain its military spending, it would simply reject the aid. 
The technical obstacle to a budget cap is that it can be evaded by concealed mis-
classification of spending items. For example, it eventually came to light that following 
an attempt by the British aid agency DFID to curtail the military spending of the 
Ugandan government, some Ugandan military spending had been mis-classified under 
the education budget. To overcome this technical obstacle would require a verified 
system of scrutiny of budget data, a function which could potentially be supplied by one 
of the international financial institutions. Again, governments which wished to avoid 
budgetary scrutiny could simply decline the aid.  
 
A third approach is to address the security needs of post-conflict governments by 
effective provision of external peacekeeping, perhaps by means of an over-the-horizon 
guarantee as in Sierra Leone.  
 
These approaches complement each other and can potentially be packaged together. A 
commitment to the external provision of security from international actors would balance 
a commitment from the post-conflict government to limit its own military spending and 
to permit sufficient scrutiny of its budgetary system to make this commitment credible. 
These matching commitments reinforce each other: the effectiveness of external 




military spending is reduced. Conversely, the perceived need for military spending would 
be reduced if there was an international commitment to the maintenance of security. 
Finally, the credibility of that commitment would be enhanced by the fact that the 
government had, at the insistence of the international community, renounced its option of 
self-defence.  
 
However, a package would need some authorizing environment which could orchestrate 
it. The package would have four components. One would be a commitment on the part of 
the donors to provide post-conflict aid. A second would be a commitment on the part of 
the Security Council to external military peacekeeping or an over-the-horizon guarantee. 
A third would be a commitment by the government to cap its military spending for the 
post-conflict decade, and to accept an international system of budgetary verification. A 
fourth would be the provision of such a system of verification. While no single entity is 
in a position directly to provide this package, there is now an entity which could negotiate 
and authorize its provision, namely the Peace Building Commission of the United 
Nations. This reports both to the Security Council and the General Assembly and was 
established in 2005 precisely because it was recognized that there was a missing link in 
the international governance architecture.  
 
Whether such a packaged approach would be politically feasible depends in particular 
upon the willingness of conflict-affected regions to accept it: the combined 
neighbourhoods of conflict-affected countries constitute a large and influential group. 
Given that the main costs of conflict accrue to these neighbourhoods, it would be in their 
interest to do so. It would also be in the interest of the developed countries that provide 
the finance both for post-conflict aid and for post-conflict peacekeeping. Their clear 
interest is that in combination this assistance should be far more successful than in the 
past.  
 
Military Intervention Opportunity 2: Peacekeeping in Post-Conflict Situations 
 
We now turn to a cost-benefit analysis of international peacekeeping. The first and 
critical step is evidently to investigate whether peacekeeping is effective in reducing the 
risk of conflict.  
 
The Effect of Peacekeeping on Risk 
 
At the time of the first Copenhagen Consensus there was no quantitative study available 
to determine whether peacekeeping is effective in reducing post-conflict risk. Although 
the chapter by Collier and Hoeffler included peacekeeping as a possible intervention, the 
analysis was based entirely upon the particular case of Sierra Leone and the contribution 
of peacekeeping was inferred from the peace in that country that had prevailed while 
peacekeepers were present, compared with an imputed counterfactual risk of conflict 
generated from the Collier-Hoeffler (2004a) model. Evidently, this was not a very 
satisfactory basis for assessing the more general impact of peacekeeping. Since then the 




and Sambanis (2006) and the CHS model of post-conflict risks which introduces 
peacekeeping as an explanatory variable.   
 
Our analysis is based upon a re-estimation of the CHS model. That model had a sample 
of 68 post-conflict situations, this being a comprehensive set of countries with post-
conflict experience and adequate data. We should note however, that the very notion of 
‘post-conflict’ is controversial. Civil wars do not always have a clear ending. Some 
researchers, though not CHS, consider that a civil war has only ended once there has been 
no fighting for two years, so that early relapses are not even analyzed. CHS then analyze 
the persistence of peace through a hazard function. Each year is treated separately, and 
the model focuses on the first ten years after the end of the civil war.  
 
Before turning to the role of military spending, it is useful to get a broader sense of the 
model through its selection of other explanatory variables and its results. Variables are 
selected through a process of stepwise deletion of a wide range of variables that have 
been proposed by the pertinent literatures. Evidently, one such literature is the 
quantitative studies on the causes of civil war, although those studies use logit analysis as 
opposed to hazard functions, and do not focus in detail upon post-conflict situations. 
These studies do, however, show that post-conflict situations are distinctively risky for 
reasons other than fixed effects. Hence, the high rate of reversion to conflict is not simply 
because these countries are inherently at high risk even prior to their initial war (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004a; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, forthcoming). The other pertinent 
strand of literature is the largely qualitative studies of post-conflict situations.  
 
CHS investigate temporal, economic, social and political influences on risk reversion as 
well as the presence of peacekeeping forces. Their analysis of temporal effects produces 
the somewhat disappointing result that during the post-conflict decade there is no ‘safe 
period’. It is known from the quantitative studies of general risks of civil war that the risk 
of reversion to conflict gradually diminishes over time. However, this risk reduction is 
slow, occurring decade-by-decade rather than year-by-year. During the first decade the 
risk indeed appears to decline, but the effect is not statistically significant nor is it 
substantial. The inference is that the entire first decade is at risk of further conflict. 
Recent delayed reversions to serious violence in Timor Leste and the DRC are consistent 
with the statistical pattern. 
 
Consistent with the influences on the overall risk of civil war, they find that two 
economic variables significantly affect the risk of reversion: the level of income and its 
growth rate. We have already discussed these effects in our analysis of aid. Despite the 
high profile given to social factors such as ethnic divisions, CHS do not find ethnic or 
religious structure to be significant in post-conflict risks. The more general analysis of the 
risk of civil war does find such effects to be significant. However, the lack of a 
specifically post-conflict effect should make us wary of dismissing peacekeeping and 
economic interventions as ‘missing the essence of the problem’. Just as ethnic and 
religious divisions between communities are usually treated as the ‘explanation’ for 
conflict, the most prominent ‘solution’ is assumed to be political, namely democracy and 




societies democracies are considerably more at risk of reversion to conflict than are 
severe autocracies, and that post-conflict elections appear to shift risk rather than reduce 
it. Risk falls sharply in the year prior to an election but increases even more in the year 
following it. Presumably, in the year before an election all the major actors hope to win 
it, whereas after the election a loser emerges whose best chance of a continuing share in 
power may then be to revert to conflict. A recent example of just this sequence, which is 
indeed too recent to be included in the CHS analysis, is the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, whose election of October 2006 was followed by large-scale fighting between the 
government army and that of the losing opponent. In that situation it seems reasonable to 
attribute the eventual restoration of post-election peace at least in part to the presence of 
17,000 international peacekeepers. If so, their presence has had a very substantial pay-off. 
In contrast, the $500m spent by the international community on promoting the elections 
may not have been a particularly good investment in peace.  
 
CHS were able to get comprehensive and detailed financial data from the United Nations 
of peacekeeping expenditures and so were able to introduce them as an explanatory 
variable in the analysis. An immediate problem is to address the potential endogeneity of 
the provision of peacekeeping. Clearly, there is some decision process that determines 
whether and how many peacekeepers are sent and for how long. The risk of conflict 
could impinge on these decisions in either direction: troop provision could be directed to 
the situations judged to be most at risk, or, if troop providing countries seek to avoid 
danger, high risk situations may systematically be avoided. Evidently, the appropriate 
way of addressing these concerns would be to find a good instrument for military 
deployment in post-conflict situations. Unfortunately, although CHS explore a number of 
potential instruments, they are not able to find one that is satisfactory. This is consistent 
with the major recent study by Doyle and Sambanis (XXX) who conclude that the 
decision process by which troops are allocated is so complex, involving repeat-play 
bargaining between a large number of countries, that it is not possible to find a 
satisfactory instrument for the scale of deployment. CHS therefore investigate the likely 
bias from failing to instrument, by initially introducing the assignment of peacekeepers as 
a dummy variable rather than as a continuous variable measuring expenditure. The 
dummy variable is significant and positive, indicating either that the decision to send 
troops increases the risk of conflict reversion, or, more credibly, that the UN decides to 
send troops to those situations which are systematically more at risk than average. This 
suggests that if there is an endogeneity problem it is most likely to bias any favourable 
effects of peacekeeping downwards: troops are being sent where risks tend to be higher. 
Thus, a result which shows troops to reduce risk is understating the true benefits since the 
true counterfactual risk is higher than that being assumed by the model.   
 
With this caveat, CHS indeed find that expenditure on post-conflict UN peacekeeping 
significantly reduces the risk of conflict reversion. The variable is significant at 2%. In 
addition to being statistically reasonably significant, the effect is quite substantial. 
However, CHS do not attempt to move from this result to a cost-benefit of peacekeeping 





For the purposes of the present study we reanalyzed the CHS model. Our primary 
extension of the CHS model was to introduce domestic military spending, that is, military 
provision by the post-conflict government. This has already been discussed above. 
However, here we should note that while the effect of such spending on post-conflict risk 
had already been analyzed in the model of Collier and Hoeffler (2006), (including due 
allowance for endogeneity by means of instrumenting), this had not been integrated with 
an analysis of external peacekeeping. In effect, there were two published studies, one on 
peacekeeping and the other on domestic military spending, but no study that combined 
the two. The inclusion of domestic military spending which we undertook for the present 
study did not overturn any of the results already described. However the additional 
variable was itself statistically significant and, importantly for our present discussion, it 
approximately doubled the estimate of the effects of peacekeeping (while statistical 
significance was unaffected). Hence, these are the results on which we base our cost-
benefit analysis.     
 
We investigate the maintenance of a peacekeeping force at a constant scale for the entire 
post-conflict decade. Some international forces have indeed been maintained for such 
long periods, although shorter periods are more common. However, since CHS do not 
find that the first few years are significantly more dangerous, a long period of provision 
seems to be the right intervention to model. It would be possible to fine-tune provision, 
gradually scaling it down somewhat as risks fall, for example due to economic recovery, 
and this would doubtless increase the ratio of benefits to costs. But again it would 
presuppose a degree of sophistication in the decision process which seems unwarranted.  
 
The reduction in risk achieved by peacekeeping forces depends upon their scale of 
deployment. Compared with no deployment, an annual expenditure of $100m reduces the 
cumulative ten-year risk very substantially from around 38% to 16.5%. At $200m per 
year the risk falls further to around 12.8%, and at $500m it is down to 9%.  
 
The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Peacekeeping 
 
To convert this reduction in risk into a benefit commensurate with costs, we multiply the 
reduction in risk by the cost should a conflict occur. Recall that each percentage point of 
risk of conflict recurrent is valued at between $586m at the lower bound and $2.5bn at 
the centre-of-the-range illustration. Hence, peacekeeping at the level of $100m per year 
for the decade generates an undiscounted benefit of between $12.6bn and $53.7bn. Since 
the undiscounted cost is $1bn, the ratio of costs to benefits is between around 1:13 and 
1:54.  
 
While the ratio of costs to benefits is a useful guide to action, it is not in fact the 
appropriate criterion by which to choose an intervention. For example, as will be evident 
from the above figures, peacekeeping forces appear to be subject to diminishing returns 
and so there is at least potentially some optimal scale of intervention. Optimality requires 
that the benefits should diminish relative to the costs so that at some stage they become 





As part of our re-analysis of the CHS model we investigated the extent and nature of 
these diminishing returns. Such diminishing benefits can potentially come from three 
different ways. One, which we investigated, is whether the effect of peacekeeping is 
better described by a non-linear treatment of the explanatory variable, such as through the 
introduction of a quadratic. We could find no such effect. A second approach would have 
been to force diminishing returns by ranking all the post-conflict situations in their order 
of estimated expected pay-off to peacekeeping. We preferred not to adopt this approach 
since it presumed that the assignment of peacekeepers as between situations would be 
highly attuned to their relative benefits, when the evidence suggests that decision 
processes are not so characterized. The approach we took was to rely for diminishing 
returns on the curvature implicit in our modelling of risk: as risks are reduced, their 
further reduction becomes progressively more difficult. This is unlikely to be a mere 
artefact but the precise degree of curvature is evidently not well-estimated. Hence, the 
results are approximate. 
 
By construction, the optimal scale of an intervention is that scale which should be chosen 
to maximize the benefits, abstracting from considerations of risk and the shadow price of 
resources. However, it is important to recognize that at this point the ratio of benefits to 
costs will not be at its maximum. The criterion of choosing the scale of an intervention by 
whether the ratio of benefits to costs is maximized is thus generally inappropriate. Rather, 
it is better to determine the optimal intervention as that at which the marginal benefit 
equals the marginal cost, and at that point evaluate the ratio of the benefits to the costs. 
This is not merely pedantic. In many types of intervention there are diminishing returns 
to the intervention, so that sub-optimal interventions have much higher ratios of benefits 
to costs. In some ways a better criterion for selection of an intervention is the estimated 
net pay-off over and above its costs. However, a high ratio of benefits to costs is 
evidently not irrelevant since it gives some reassurance that even if the numbers are quite 
inaccurate there is little danger of doing net harm. 
 
We find that the optimal scale of peacekeeping forces is around $850m. At this stage the 
risk of conflict reversion is reduced to only 7.3%, the last percentage point reduction (i.e. 
from 8.3%) costing $2.4bn over the decade to achieve benefits of $2.5bn (taking our 
centre-of-the-range illustration). At this level, the risk of conflict has been reduced by a 
little over 30 percentage points and so has generated gross gains of around $75bn (taking 
our centre-of-the-range figure) compared to its cost of $8.5bn. While this leads to a much 
less impressive ratio of costs-to-benefits of around 1:9, it leads to an enormous overall 
gain per post-conflict situation of around $63.5bn. 
 
While these numbers might seem astoundingly large, this is because of the nature of the 
phenomenon. If, for example, we take the current practical example of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the large UN force is costing around $1bn per year, and so within 
the vicinity of what looks from our figures to be appropriate. During the presence of these 
forces peace has been maintained, albeit with periodic outbreaks of considerable 
violence, one of which, as noted, followed the elections. A counterfactual with a high 
probability of relapse into large scale violence is by no means unreasonable in this 




peacekeepers at this scale would bring down the risk by 30 percentage points and this 
again seems entirely within the credible range for the DRC. Indeed, many commentators 
might regard the estimate as being overly conservative for the DRC, where the risk of 
large scale violence in the absence of international peacekeepers might have been rather 
higher than the 38% of the peacekeeping benchmark. Similarly, our analysis supposes 
that a collapse into civil war in the DRC would incur global costs of the order of $250bn. 
Again, although an accurate figure is impossible, this does not seem to be absurd once all 
the potential neighbourhood and global repercussions are considered. If the international 
community could with certainty ‘buy’ the difference between sustained peace and 
collapse in the DRC for around two years worth of the global aid budget it would quite 
possibly choose to do so. 
 
In summary, international peacekeeping looks to be a good intervention. If the 
intervention is kept to a modest scale it has a very high cost-benefit ratio, and if it is set at 
an optimal scale it delivers enormous overall net gains.  
 
Military Intervention Opportunity 3: Over-the-Horizon Guarantees 
 
Now imagine that the instrument of a security guarantee could be elevated to a fully-
fledged international instrument, whether under the auspices of the United Nations or a 
regional entity such as the African Union. To avoid the problems encountered by the 
French in Rwanda, the security guarantee would have to be circumscribed by clear limits: 
for example, governments in the process of genocide could not expect to be propped up 
by international military intervention. Here we propose three possible criteria for 
eligibility for the provision of protection. The three are not exclusive. 
 
The first is the automatic provision of powerful peacekeeping forces to protect 
governments that came to power through certified democratic elections from the threat of 
rebellion during their period of office. The second is a similar protection against the 
threat of a coup d’etat. The third is for an over-the-horizon guarantee in post-conflict 
societies. While the initial maintenance of peace cannot credibly be done without troops 
on the ground, the British experience to date in Sierra Leone suggests that it may be 
possible to phase the bulk of international troops out after say five years, replacing them 
with a guarantee made credible by appropriate logistics for the second five-year period.  
 
Supposing that this cover was attempted, would it be effective, what would be its 
benefits, and what would it cost? This is the remit of the present analysis. 
 
The over-the-horizon guarantee and the risk of conflict 
 
The original Collier-Hoeffler study for the Copenhagen Consensus briefly discussed 
over-the-horizon guarantees, but there was no basis for quantification other than to 
assume that the Sierra Leone intervention was the model for all such interventions. Since 
the time of that study a new model of the risk of conflict, namely that of Collier, Hoeffler 
and Rohner (forthcoming) has specifically estimated the impact of the French over-the-




well-understood that French forces would be likely to intervene to support regimes in 
Francophone Africa and this was made credible logistically be a string of French military 
bases in the region. As discussed, the policy was operational from the time of 
independence of France’s African colonies until the coup in Cote d’Ivoire of December 
1999 revealed that as a result of the experience in Rwanda French policy had been 
rethought.  
 
As with our assessment of peacekeeping, the first and critical step is to quantify the 
impact of the over-the-horizon guarantee on the risk of conflict. Because the French 
guarantee lasted for over thirty years and covered an entire group of countries it is 
amenable to statistical investigation. If the guarantee was effective we would expect these 
countries to have a significantly lower incidence of civil war than predicted by their other 
characteristics. This is tested by Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (forthcoming). They 
introduce a dummy variable for the guarantee into a global analysis of the onset of civil 
war for the period 1965-2004. They find that the variable is significant and substantial: 
the risk of civil war in these countries during this period was only one third what would 
otherwise have been expected. They then investigate whether the dummy could have 
other explanations: in particular, whether all Francophone countries are systematically 
less at risk regardless of their location, and whether Francophone African countries are 
less at risk regardless of the period. Each of these alternative hypotheses can be rejected 
in favour of the interpretation that it was only Francophone African countries during this 
period that were significantly less at risk. Of course, this does not preclude that there was 
some other feature of these countries that was distinctive during this period. Nevertheless, 
the external security commitment seems a likely explanation. After all, the French 
government was committing significant sums to maintaining this military capability. In 
aggregate the risk of a civil war breaking out in one or other of the 13 countries of 
Francophone Africa was reduced by three quarters, the annual risk for the countries 
combined falling from around 10.2% to around 2.6%. 
 
The risk reduction achieved by the French security guarantee will form our estimate of 
the likely efficacy of an international guarantee. However, our purpose is not to arrive at 
a cost-benefit analysis of the French guarantee itself, but to use the effects of the 
guarantee as a guide to other contexts in which such guarantees might be used. Evidently, 
the French guarantee was effective and CHR have quantified its contribution. However, 
in extrapolating from this result to post-conflict guarantees we face a choice. Such 
situations have far higher levels of risk than those prevailing in Francophone Africa and 
we could potentially assume either that the reduction in risk is of the same absolute or 
proportionate amount. Whereas the decade-risk facing the typical Francophone country in 
this period was around 10%, that facing the typical post-conflict country is around 40%. 
In effect, we must choose whether a guarantee provided in a post-conflict setting would 
bring the risk down by 7.6 percentage points, as in Francophone Africa, or by around 30 
percentage points, which would be the same proportionate impact. Recall that a reduction 
of 30 percentage points would make the contribution commensurate with a large 
peacekeeping force in-country. We therefore prefer to choose the lower figure. Only in 




underlying risk levels are broadly comparable to those in Francophone Africa, we will 
extrapolate by assuming that risks are reduced by three-quarters.  
 
The cost-benefit analysis of a guarantee 
 
We will consider the benefits from a guarantee of forces broadly equivalent to the scale 
and credibility of commitment provided by France for 30 years, but provided 
internationally to countries which met the criteria specified above.  
 
First, consider the guarantee to support democratic governments militarily should they be 
threatened by a rebellion. According to UCDP/PRIO data, in the past decade four 
democratic low-income countries have suffered outbreaks of civil war and we take this as 
the likely rate over the next decade. If an international guarantee could reduce this by 
three-quarters, as did the French guarantee, then three of these wars would be averted. 
The annual benefit would be in the range $18bn (lower bound) to $75bn (centre-of-
range).  
 
We now attempt to get an equivalent benefit to the replacement of external peacekeepers 
in the second-half of the first decade of post-conflict situations by a guarantee. Of course, 
at present, most peacekeepers are withdrawn before this period but on our analysis this is 
a mistake. The counterfactual depends not just on whether peacekeepers are present, but 
on their scale and the scale of the withdrawal. We will construct the experiment so as to 
keep the level of risk in the post-conflict country constant. Thus, we assume that the 
over-the-horizon guarantee reduces risk by around seven percentage points and release 
peacekeeping troops in-country up to the point where the withdrawal creates an offsetting 
increase in the risk of seven percentage points. This clearly depends upon the size of 
forces. For example, if the initial forces were at the ‘optimal’ level of $850m, then they 
could be scaled back to merely $150m while leaving the overall risk level unaffected. In 
practice, this ‘optimal’ level will normally be excessive because it makes no allowance 
for aversion to risk. If the typical provision were $500m then it could be scaled back to 
around $100m. If provision were at $250m it could be scaled back to $70m.  
 
The benefit of a centralized guarantee then depends upon how many situations to which it 
might apply. Normally, there are around six countries in the second half of the first 
decade post-conflict. Hence, the global gain in peacekeeping would range from $4.2bn 
down to around $1.1bn depending upon the scale of peacekeeping. In order to simplify 
we will take the central figure based on a force of $500m, implying a saving of $2.4bn 
annually. 
 
The third and final possible coverage of a guarantee would be against coups d’etats in 
democracies. In many respects this is the easiest task for a guarantee: coups in small, 
low-income countries can usually be made unviable by an adequate and prompt scale of 
external intervention. For example, the African Union was able to put down the coup 
d’etat in the democratic mini-state of Sao Tome, Principe by the threat of military 
intervention from Nigeria, but it lacks the logistical power to reverse coups in larger 




deterrence of coups. Recall that the annual cost of successful coups to Africa over the 
past 40 years has been within the range of $4bn to $16bn. By not means all these coups 
threatened democracies and coups are getting less common, but recall that democracy 
does not provide protection against coups: even in 2006 there was a coup attempt against 
the democratic government of Madagascar which was fortunately unsuccessful. The best 
that we can do here is to assume that as with civil war a credible guarantee would reduce 
the risk by three-quarters, and that this would apply to the more democratic half of 
Africa’s countries. This would imply savings within the range of $1.5bn to $6bn per year.  
 
We now turn to the costs. The financial cost of the French over-the-horizon guarantee is 
not simple to determine. Partly, military budgets are invariably subject to a degree of 
secrecy and partly the counterfactual is obscure. However, for our estimate we relied 
upon an informal estimate from the French Treasury. It must be treated as subject to 
caveats. The estimate was that the cost was of the order of $1bn per year. This is a high 
figure, equivalent to a super-force of peacekeepers in a single country, but this very scale 
presumably added to its credibility. Indeed, the guarantee force must evidently be at least 
as large as that needed in the largest envisaged operation. Since the French guarantee 
applied only to Francophone Africa, a more extensive guarantee such as we envisage 
would presumably be more expensive. In what follows we suppose that the cost of an 
international force would be double that of the French force at $2bn. 
 
Combining the benefits with the costs, the pay-off to the guarantee depends upon whether 
the same force can cover all three risks. If it can then the benefits are very large relative 
to the costs. The lower edge of the combined benefits is $19bn per year and the centre-of-
the-range estimate is around $81bn. Since the assumed cost is only $2bn per year, the 
implied ratio of costs to benefits is from 1:10 to 1:40.  
 
Packaging Interventions: Post-Conflict Aid+Military Spending 
Limits+Peacekeeping+Guarantees 
 
As is apparent from our previous discussion, our four interventions complement each 
other. The effectiveness of post-conflict aid can be enhanced by limits on military 
spending. Those limits, and the curtailed military spending that they imply, can in turn be 
made more acceptable by the offer of credible external security provision. If this is 
provided in the form of an over-the-horizon guarantee, not only is it cheaper for those 
who provide it, but it is less intrusive and so more acceptable for those who receive it. In 
particular, while a guarantee against coups does not of itself generate particularly large 
global gains, it generates huge gains for the governments who benefit from them: coups 
are by far the biggest risk of regime change in low-income countries. Hence, such a 
guarantee might be sufficiently attractive to governments for them to be prepared to 
accept more limited military spending. Finally, the growth that substantial post-conflict 
aid would generate, and the strategy of phasing in over-the-horizon guarantees provides 
the long term credible ‘exit strategies’ that are now essential before credible international 
military commitments are likely to be forthcoming.  Thus, the package is more credible 





Further, each component of the package has clear precedents. Post-conflict aid is now 
standard, something that was not the case a decade ago. For example, the World Bank 
now has an explicit window for this need which lasts for the first seven post-conflict 
years. Military spending limits are applied by donors, but currently largely on an ad hoc 
basis. At the regional level, President Arias of Costa Rica is promoting an initiative for a 
coordinated mutual limitation on military spending, recognizing its properties as a 
regional public bad. Peacekeeping has grown enormously over the past decade, with 
DPKO the key agency within the UN system. Finally, over-the-horizon guarantees have 
been reintroduced by the British in Sierra Leone, and are being attempted by the African 
Union to guard against coups. Europe already has a ‘rapid reaction force’ which has the 
potential to enforce these guarantees. What has been missing to date is the vision to 
combine these interventions. However, the recent creation of the Peace-Building 
Commission of the UN, jointly under the Security Council and the General Assembly, 
provides an entity which could potentially coordinate such a vision. The Commission did 
not exist at the time of the first Copenhagen Consensus and so there was no potential to 
coordinate such a package of instruments.  
 
We therefore conclude with a ‘grand vision’ of a security package that combines all four 
instruments. Since the linkages between the components are primarily political we have 
not attempted to quantify them. Hence, in terms of our estimated costs and benefits the 
package merely sums the components so that each can be accepted or rejected separately 
according to the threshold adopted. However, the package has political coherence and so 
it is worth also considering the four instruments together. We work with both our ‘centre-
of-the-range’ illustration, and the lower-bound estimate which is around one quarter of 
this pay-off.  
 
Post-conflict aid would be increased by 2% of GDP for the entire post-conflict decade, 
and on average cover twelve countries each with a GDP of $20bn. It would thus cost 
$4.8bn a year and add around one percentage point to the growth rate of post-conflict 
countries during this period. Combined with the ceiling aimed at preventing the leakage 
of this aid into military spending, this would yield a pay-off of between around $12bn 
(lower bound) and $21bn (centre-of-range). 
 
Ceilings on military spending by post-conflict countries would aim to reduce such 
spending by 0.2 percentage points of GDP, this being the likely leakage from the 
additional aid. This would reduce spending by around $480m per year in these countries, 
with a benefit in terms of reduced risk of conflict of the order of $7bn (lower bound) and 
$28bn (centre-of-range).  
 
Peacekeeping forces would be provided in post-conflict settings at a scale of around 
$500m per year in the typical country, being scaled down through the use of over-the-
horizon guarantees in the second five years. Until allowance is made for double-counting 
due to the risk-reduction from the other components of the package, the ten-year risk per 
country would fall from around 38% to around 9%. With twelve such countries the 
annual cost would be around $4bn and the annual gain between around $21bn (lower 





Finally, an over-the-horizon guarantee would be provided at a cost of $2bn per year. 
Again before allowing for double counting of risk reduction from other elements of the 
package, the gains from lower risks would be between around $17bn (lower bound) and 
$70bn (centre-of-range) per year.  
 
The combined cost of the package would be around $10.8bn per year. The benefits once 
double counting of security gains are eliminated, would be between around $57bn (lower 
bound) and $192bn (centre-of-range). Decomposing this, using the centre-of-range 
figures, it consists of security gains post-conflict of around $100bn, increased GDP of 
around $11bn, reduced coup risk of around $6bn and fewer wars in democracies of 




Peace is a pre-condition for social and economic development. Civil war is development 
in reverse. Peace is an implicit assumption of those other challenge strategies that involve 
activities in the poorest countries.  Further, internal violent conflict, both in the form of 
civil wars and coups is highly persistent: one manifestation of violence begets another. 
Such violence is concentrated among the poorest and least hopeful countries on earth. 
There is thus a powerful case for peace to be an objective for international intervention: it 
is both primary and well-targeted. The evident caveat to prioritizing peace is whether the 
international community can do anything to further it. After the intervention in Iraq many 
people might reasonably feel that the unintended consequences of security interventions 
are such that intervention in any form is too risky.  
 
In this paper we have attempted to show that there is now considerable evidence that a 
combination of post-conflict aid and the provision of security through military 
interventions of various forms can fairly reliably and substantially bring risks down. 
Cumulatively this would radically lower the incidence of global conflict. That is, 
international intervention is effective.  
 
The most difficult stage of our analysis has been to move from this demonstration of 
effectiveness to an analysis of cost-effectiveness. This is because assigning a value to the 
benefit of global peace is intrinsically problematic. We have therefore presented both a 
‘lower-bound’ figure which has some reasonable basis in quantitative analysis, and a 
‘centre-of-range’ figure which is much more speculative but which we feel may better 
capture true sentiments.  
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the costs and benefits of the various measures. We use 
alternatively discount rates of 3% and 6%. Depending on which of these measures is 
taken, the ratio of costs of our package to its benefits varies from around 1:4 to 1:18. The 
individual components of the package range much more widely. Whether this is 
sufficient to warrant prioritization is a matter for the panel. However, it seems to us that 




interventions are effective and the absolute costs are not out of bounds, the interventions 
should be undertaken.  







Table 1: A Summary of Costs and Benefits 
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over 10 years 
BCR 
Discount rate 3%, DALY cost $1,000. Cost of war is 58.6 bn 
Aid  4bn  880m    10 bn    10.9 bn  2.7 
Conditionality  4bn  880 m  650m  11.7 bn    13.3  bn  3.3 
Peace-keeping troops  1bn  12.6 bn 
 
   12.6  bn  12.6 
Optimal level of PKOs  8.5 bn  18.0 bn        18 bn  2.1 
Over-the-horizon guarantees (costs and benefits 
calculated for six post-conflict countries) 
$20bn  $176bn        15 bn  191 bn  9.6 
 
Combined 500m-PKO and over-the-horizon 
guarantee (costs and benefits calculated for six 
post-conflict countries plus countries at coup 
risk) 
$28 bn  $103.6 bn      15 bn  118.7  4.2 
Discount rate 6%, DALY cost $1,000. Cost of war is 49.8 bn 
Aid 4bn  744m    10  bn    10.7bn  2.7 
Conditionality  4bn  744m  550m  11.7 bn    13.2  bn  3.3 
Peace-keeping troops  1bn  10.7bn 
 
   10.7  bn  10.7 
Optimal level of PKOs  8.5 bn  15.3bn        15.3 bn  1.8 
Over-the-horizon guarantees (costs and benefits 
calculated for all six post-conflict countries) 
$20bn  $149bn       15 bn  164 bn  8.2 
 
Combined 500m-PKO and over-the-horizon 
guarantee (costs and benefits calculated for all 
six post-conflict countries plus countries at 
coup risk) 




Discount rate 3%, DALY cost $5,000. Cost of war is 78.5 bn 
Aid  4bn  1.2 bn    10 bn    11.2 bn  2.8 
Conditionality  4bn  1.2 bn  650m  11.7 bn    13.3  bn  3.3 
Peace-keeping troops  1bn  16.9 bn 
 
   16.9  bn  16.9 
Optimal level of PKOs  8.5 bn  24.1 bn        24.1 bn  2.8 
Over-the-horizon guarantees (costs and benefits 
calculated for six post-conflict countries) 
$20bn  $234 bn        15 bn  249 bn  12.5 
 
Combined 500m-PKO and over-the-horizon 
guarantee (costs and benefits calculated for all 
six post-conflict countries plus countries at 
coup risk) 
$28 bn  $135.6 bn      15 bn  163.6 bn  5.8 
Discount rate 6%, DALY cost $5,000. Cost of war is 69 bn 
Aid  4bn  1.0 bn    10 bn    11.0 bn  2.8 
Conditionality  4bn  1.0 bn  550m  11.7 bn    13.3  bn  3.3 
Peace-keeping troops  1bn  14.8 bn 
 
   14.8  bn  14.8 
Optimal level of PKOs  8.5 bn  21.2 bn        21.2  bn  2.5 
Over-the-horizon guarantees (costs and benefits 
calculated for six post-conflict countries) 
$20bn  $207 bn       15 bn  227 bn  11.4 
 
Combined 500m-PKO and over-the-horizon 
guarantee (costs and benefits calculated for all 
six post-conflict countries plus countries at 
coup risk) 
$28 bn  $119 bn      15 bn  134 bn  4.8 
Centre-range cost estimate: Cost of war is 250bn 
Aid  4bn   3.8 bn    10bn    13.8 bn  3.5 
Conditionality  4bn   3.8 bn  2.6 bn  11.7 bn    18.1  bn  4.5 
Peace-keeping troops  1bn   53.7bn         53.7 bn  53.7 
Optimal level of PKOs  8.5 bn   310bn        310 bn  36.5 
Over-the-horizon guarantees (costs and benefits 
calculated for six post-conflict countries) 
20bn  750bn        60 bn  810 bn  40.5 
 
Over-the-horizon guarantees (costs and benefits 
calculated for six post-conflict countries)  
20bn  762 bn      15 bn  762 bn  38.1 
 
Combined 500m-PKO and over-the-horizon 
guarantee (costs and benefits calculated for six 
post-conflict countries plus countries at coup 





Over-the-horizon guarantees (costs and benefits 
calculated for six post-conflict countries plus 
countries at coup risk) 
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